MG William T. Sherman
My thanks to North Carolina State University for this transcript of Sherman’s letter to Halleck on 24 December 1864. Pictures shown are purely for educational purposes and no permission has been sought. Blue characters are additions and corrections I have made to the transcript. If any mistakes are found, please let me know by contacting me here.
TO HENRY W. HALLECK
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi.,
In the Field, Savannah, Ga.,
December 24, 1864.
Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck,
Chief of Staff, Washington City, D.C.:
General:
I had the pleasure to receive your two letters of the 16th and 18th instant today, and I feel more than usually flattered by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which is now complete by the occupation of Savannah [21 December 1863]. I am also very glad that General Grant [LTG H. Ulysses Grant, CG US Army] has changed his mind about embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina, and still more gratified at the news from Thomas [MG George H. Thomas, CG US Army of the Cumberland] in Tennessee, because it fulfills my plan, which contemplated his being fully able to dispose of Hood [GEN John B. Hood, CG CS Army of Tennessee] in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River; so I think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis’ [CS Pres. Jefferson F. Davis] disappointment in not turning nay Atlanta campaign into a Moscow disaster [a reference to Empereur des Françai Napoleone di Buonaparte’s failed invasion of Russia Empire in 1812]. I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the Ogeechee over to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance, &c., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in remodeling the enemy’s interior lines to suit our future plans and purposes. I have also laid down the programme of a campaign which I can make this winter, and put me in the spring on the Roanoke, in direct communication with him on the James River. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster [BG John G. Foster, CG US Department of North Carolina (an occupation force)] the city of Savannah, and to sally forth, with my army resupplied, cross the Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between, breaking en route the Charleston and Augusta Railroad, also a large part of that front Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and then rapidly moving to some point of the railroad from Charleston to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston according to the importance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad communications are broken. I take it for granted the present movement on Wilmington will fail, because I know that gunboats cannot take a fort, and Butler [MG Benjamin F. Butler, CG US Army of the James] has not the force or the ability to take it. If I should determine to take Charleston I would turn across the country, which I have hunted over many a time, from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing on the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper. After accomplishing one or other of these ends I would make a bee-line for Raleigh, or Weldon, when Lee [GEN Robert E. Lee, CG CS Army of Northern Virginia] would be forced to come out of Richmond or acknowledge himself beaten . He would, I think, by the use of the Danville railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not alarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I would force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and if the worst came to the worst I could fight my way down to Albemarle Sound or New Berne.
I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them — as for instance, my recent campaign. I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point, as the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be brought to bear in any one battle; and I don’t believe any one general can handle more than 6o,000 men in battle. I think my campaign of the last month, as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee’s army as though I were operating within the mound of his artillery. I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his successes to the very uttermost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Miss., or Selma, Ala., both of which lie in districts of country which I know to be rich in corn and meat. I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy’s country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular. We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect [it, in fact, played a major role in US Pres. Abraham Lincoln’s reelection]. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under a pretty good state of discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia; and I think before we are done, South Carolina will not be quite so tempestuous. I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don’t think salt will be necessary. When I move the Fifteenth Corps will be on the right of the Right Wing, and their position will bring them, naturally, into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that I was en route for that State the invariable reply was, “Well, if you will make those people feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.” I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there, as we did at Milledgeville. I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official report, and think I had better wait until I get my subordinate reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly, not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for we marched the whole distance in two or more columns, and, of course, I could only be present with one, and generally that one engaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction was performed better than usual, because I had an engineer regiment provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Such bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad line can be reconstructed across Georgia will be to make a new road from Fairburn Station, twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta, to Madison, a distance of 1oo miles; and before that can be done I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee’s [LTG William J. Hardee, CG CS Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida] escape from me, but really am not to blame. I moved as quick as possible to close up the “Union Causeway,” but intervening obstacles were such that before I could get my troops on the road Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis; for the Georgia troops, under G. W. Smith [MG Gustavus Woodson Smith, Georgia State Militia], declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and have gone north en route for Augusta, and I have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington — in other words, they are scattered. I have reason to believe that Beauregard [GEN Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard, CG CS Department of the West] was present in Savannah at the time of its evacuation, and I think he and Hardee are now in Charleston, doubtless making preparations for what they know will be my next step.
Please say to the President that I received his kind message through Colonel Markland [COL Absalom H. Markland, CO US Army Mail Services], and feel thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of zeal or love to the cause. Of you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too late. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.
Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your friend,
W. T. Sherman,
Major-General.