MG Charles T. Menoher.
The Menoher Board’s final report on an independent air department and service is taken from:
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives. Report of a Board of Officers Convened to Report Upon the New and Curry Bills Which Propose the Creation of an Executive Department of Aeronautics. 66th Congress, 1st Session, War Expenditures Vol. 3. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 (Aviation) of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department: 3483-3492.
These papers have been reproduced as originally written, with spelling corrections and editorial additions highlighted and bracketed in blue. If you find any errors in my transcription, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Report of a Board of Officers Convened to Report Upon the New and Curry Bills Which Propose the Creation of an Executive Department of Aeronautics
Commissioned by MG Peter C. Harris, Adjutant General, on 8 August 1919.
MG Charles T. Menoher, Chief of Army Air Service (Chair)
MG Frank W. Coe, Chief of Coast Artillery Corps
MG William B. Haan, Director War Plans Division
MG William J. Snow, Chief of Field Artillery Branch
Board convened on 12 August 1919.
Board adjourned on 27 October 1919.
1. The first meeting of the board was held in Washington, D. C., on August 12, 1919. Thereafter other meetings were held at frequent intervals.
2. The board has examined many individual reports of boards, commissions, and other documents bearing upon the subjects under consideration. It has also examined a number of witnesses orally and, in answer to its inquiries, has received telegraphic reports giving opinions of important division, corps, and Army commanders who actually took part in combat using aircraft as a part of their commands. Letters from military aviators advocating a separate department were sent to the board by order of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, Air Service, United States Army, who is, himself, an advocate of a separate aeronautical department coordinate with the Army and Navy. These are all covered in the following appendices:
Appendix A. Important, memoranda, etc.
Appendix B. Names of witnesses examined orally without making record.
Appendix C. Opinions of important commanders received by telegraph at the request of the board.
Appendix D. Letters written to the board at suggestion of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, Air Service, United States Army, from aviators favoring a separate department of aeronautics.
Appendix E. Letter from Post Office Department in connection with letter mail.
3. Fundamental considerations: Practically all men who have given this subject careful consideration are agreed upon certain fundamental facts, which may be stated as follows:
(a) In future wars aeronautics will play an increasingly important role, the magnitude of which will, in large measure, be in proportion to the capacity of the Nation to produce aircraft and to train personnel for its maintenance and operation.
(b) On account of the short life of aircraft and the great cost of production and maintenance, no nation can in time of peace maintain military air fleets even approximating in size to such as will be necessary in time of war. Such military air fleets must, therefore, be provided after the beginning of the emergency. The nation which is prepared so that it can be the first to produce, equip, and maintain a superior air force will have an undoubted advantage.
(c) If commercial aeronautics were a paying business, large plants would be established in the United States for producing commercial aircraft without other governmental stimulation than that provided for other business affairs. These plants would develop expert aeronautical engineers, expert mechanics, and all classes of personnel necessary for aircraft production and maintenance. In time of war the Nation’s producing capacity, already organized, would be
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diverted from the production of commercial aircraft to the production of military aircraft. This would be comparatively a simple proposition. The Nation would also have a great reservoir of commercial aviators from which, in a short period of time, military aviators could be selected and trained, and a limited portion of its commercial fleet could be utilized without radical alterations for certain war purposes. Thus, at the beginning of the war, it would be possible to develop under military control, in a most expeditious manner, probably the largest and best military air force that any nation could produce.
(d) At the present time commercial aeronautics is not a paying business; neither is there any prospect that commercial aeronautics will, in the near future, develop in any large measure by itself. Even with governmental support, no definite period can be fixed after which commercial aeronautics will be able to stand by itself. Up to the present time, Congress had not seen flt to make appropriations for the purpose of developing commercial aeronautics.
This is the only means by which commercial aeronautics on anything like a large scale, and hence production on a large scale, can be developed In the immediate future. The extent of such development will be in proportion:
(1) To the size of annual Government appropriations, and
(2) To the period of years for which such appropriations are guaranteed. Private capital will not undertake the development of an industry based upon a single annual appropriation without any guaranty as to subsequent appropriations which will be necessary for the continued maintenance of the industry.
NOTE. – For a possible exception to this statement, see Appendix E.
(e) The Government itself should not undertake the production of aircraft; such action could only be justified to counteract trade combinations against the Government. Competition by the Government with private industry will always tend to destroy the latter. Government production may be a necessity in the case of articles of no commercial value, as ordnance. On the other hand, no sound business reasons can be advanced for Government production of commercially successful material, such as motor transport. The production of aircraft, while not yet in this class, might, by adequate Government assistance, eventually come thereunder. The eventual existence of large commercial air fleets, foreseen by many, would place it entirely in the latter class.
(f) Federal agencies should be provided for the adequate control of various matters connected with aeronautics, both commercial and military. These are discussed at length in the various reports listed above, and the mention of the following most important provisions is sufficient at this time:
(1) Provisions for furnishing to air fleets the necessary meteorological data similar to that now furnished by the Weather Bureau to shipping.
(2) National and international regulation of air traffic.
(3) The licensing of pilots.
(4) Inspection and licensing of aircraft.
(5) Standardization of signals and maps.
(6) Enactment and enforcement of laws relating to accidents and insurance.
(g) It is desirable that a single Governmental agency be responsible for the procurement of all aircraft used in the Government service, in order that duplication and waste may be avoided and that the producing industry of the country may be judiciously fostered in the placing of Government orders.
(h) It is also admittedly desirable that a single Governmental agency should be established for the purpose of development work, in so far as these matters pertain to development common to all branches of aeronautics – military, naval, and commercial. This agency should be provided with the means for carrying on experimental and research work and for testing materials. It should also be charged with the collection and publication of data valuable to provide industry or individual inventors and, where not incompatible with inventive progress, with the standardization of material, equipment, and methods of construction.
(i) Various civil departments of the Government have need of aircraft in the performance of their functions and in the improvement of their service to the public. Such appropriations as Congress may provide for these purposes will serve to aid the aircraft industry, but can not produce far-reaching results.
4. With the acceptance of the foregoing, there appear to be three different lines of investigation which demand further study; these may he stated as follows:
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(a) In case large congressional appropriations be made for the purpose of assisting commercial aeronautics, what specifically are the means or methods whereby this purpose is to be accomplished?
(b) Is a separate department of aeronautics necessary to build up commercial aeronautics and control all questions relating thereto?
(c) If a separate aeronautical department or agency be established, should it include the aeronautical services of the Army and Navy?
These will be considered in order.
5. (a) In case large congressional appropriations be made for the purpose of assisting commercial aeronautics, what specifically are the means or methods whereby this purpose is to be accomplished?
In order to attempt a clear conception of just what is involved in this question, let us assume that the Government has obligated itself to appropriate annually for a period of 10 years the sum of $300,000,000 per year for the purpose of assisting commercial aeronautics. The total appropriation for these 10 years then amounts to $3,000,000,000. Just how is this to be expended?
It is impossible, of course, to present here definite estimates covering such expenditures, but not more than 10 per cent of such appropriation need be devoted to subsidiary purposes, such as the development of the meteorological service, the procurement and the publication of maps, and the various other items enumerated above under paragraph 3 (f). It will also be admitted that allotments from the annual appropriations should be made for the establishment of commercial air routes. Such projects would demand large amounts of money; they would include the establishment of landing centers with an equipment of airdromes, machine shops, and personnel; the establishment of emergency landing fields between the large airdromes and the equipment of the landing centers with various means of telegraphic and radio communication or control and navigational aids. In other words, the project may be visualized by comparing it with the building of a railroad with roadbed, stations, roundhouses, telegraph lines, etc., complete except for rolling stock; and an invitation to private capital to provide the rolling stock and utilize the roadbed, free of charge. After all this is done, and after all of the various secondary matters have been given attention, there still remains in the realm of speculation the question as to whether or not private investors would utilize the air routes sufficiently to create what is being sought, namely, an adequate aircraft industry to meet the production needs of war.
If the air routes would be so utilized, then practically the entire appropriation could be utilized for the construction of such routes; if, on the other hand, the mere establishment of these routes does not produce the requisite air fleets to use them, it would be necessary to limit the portion of the appropriation used for these purposes and to retain a part of it for the purpose of rendering still more attractive to private capital the production and operation of air fleets. The further inducement necessary might take the form of direct subsidy, such as direct payment to any corporation or firm for the maintenance and service of an aeroplane and its pilot. Such subsidies have heretofore found no place in our government policy, but It seems more than likely that they will become necessary if we are to embark upon a program which has for its object the adequate preparedness of this country for air defense in case of war. It is reported by the French air attaché to the United States that in France direct subsidies are already in force. The French Government pays each company one-fourth of the price of the airplane provided that this machine is acceptable to the Government as being capable of rendering service in time of war. The Government also pays each company 10,000 francs per year per pilot as part salary for each pilot. In Great Britain the means so far employed are reported to be restricted to establishing and improving aerial routes, but the present indications give no assurance. that the desired result will be attained thereby.
6. The present reported feverish activity for the development of ” commercial aeronautics,” of certain nations already saddled with enormous debts, under the guise of developing a new and highly lauded system of transportation is, as a matter of fact, nothing more than a new race for supremacy in armaments. The hope is expressed in the proposed treaties growing out of the World War that excessive armaments might be limited and thereby lessen the already great burden of taxation. It Is not the intention of this board to deny the wisdom of a policy which will place this Nation in the front rank with regard to commercial aeronautics or a proper state of defense. It
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is thought, however, that this question should be stripped entirely of its camouflage and that the Nation at large should be apprised of the real situation and the terms upon which it is to enter this contest.
7. (b) Is a separate department of aeronautics necessary to build up commercial aeronautics and control all questions relating thereto?
If a national policy be adopted by Congress covering a period of say not less than 10 years and providing for large annual appropriations for the development of commercial aeronautics, as indicated in paragraph 5, a suitable agency for administering the expenditure of these funds is necessary. Such an agency should naturally control also the procurement of all Government aircraft and aircraft material, the development work common to all types of aircraft, and many or all of the subsidiary activities mentioned in paragraph 3 (f). The determining factor as to the character which this governmental agency should assume is the size of such continued annual appropriations. If they are to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, an executive department is suggested as a suitable solution. The question of the kind of agency that should be established if the Government does not accept the foregoing as a policy will be taken up in a later paragraph.
8. (c) If a separate aeronautical department or agency be established, should it include the aeronautical service of the Army and Navy?
It is believed that certain fundamental considerations regarding this question may be enunciated as follows:
(1) Military forces can not be efficiently trained nor can they operate efficiently without an air force.
NOTE. – The greatest deficiency of the American Air Force in the A. E. F. was that it had not been trained with the other combat branches of the Army. In the United States its camps were widely separated from the training camps for the combat troops. It was in no sense under the orders of such commanders. When it arrived in France it was again separated from the combat troops and came in contact with them only when it tried to help them in battle. Then It was found that neither the troops on the ground nor the flyers in the air understood how to get together in operations. Their training, therefore, had to be given them during battle, and an expensive training it was.
The fact has been generally overlooked in all discussions that the training of the other combat branches and liaison services of the Army can not be completely given without having available during their entire period of training air forces, not only flyers, but ground troops. It is just as important for all these forces to be trained with the air forces as it is for the air forces to be trained with them. This was clearly illustrated in some of our divisions in France who had been carefully trained in everything except working with air forces before they went into battle. When they went into battle, this training had to be given during battle, and it was a larger and more difficult problem and required a wider and greater effort to train the other combat branches to work with the air forces than it did to get the air forces to understand their method of working with the ground combat troops. The problem, therefore, must be looked upon from both sides. A military fighting unit composed of all arms can not be completely trained without having all arms, including air forces, as a part of it, because the training of each of the arms depends so largely upon its understanding of the powers, limitations, and duties of the other combat branches in the final team which makes the fighting unit. Such complete team work can not be brought about unless during peace as well as war all the elements which constitute the fighting unit, no matter how large that unit may be, form integrad parts thereof and are constantly under full military control.
(2) An air force acting independently can not win a war against a civilized nation nor, by itself, accomplish a decision against forces on the ground.
(3) With respect to an army, an air force is an essential combat branch and forms an integral part of that army as do the other combat branches. To insure success, the air force must be controlled in the same way, understand the same discipline, and act in accordance with the army command under precisely the same conditions as do the other branches.
(4) In order to establish the control in battle, as outlined under the preceding section, the air force, equally with the other branches, must fully understand its exact functions in working with them. It must know their needs. It must be in full sympathy with them. It must think in the same military atmosphere and have the same esprit de corps. Such conditions can not be
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brought about in any force unless it is an integral part of the command, not only during battle but also during its entire period of its doctrinal training. It must be a part of such command in fact, and not a temporary attachment thereto.
(5) The foregoing apply equally to the Navy in practically all respects.
COROLLARY. – Whatever may be the decision as to a separate aeronautical department, the military air force must remain under the complete control of the Army and form an integral part thereof both in peace and in war.
9. This question stated at the beginning of paragraph 8, is perhaps of equal importance with the question as to the policy of the Government regarding national appropriations for the development of commercial aeronautics. The policy of the Government with respect to preparedness and appropriations for that purpose is distinctly one regarding which the Nation must rely upon Congress to furnish the proper solution. On the other hand, the effective organization for a proper defense is purely a military question and, while the ultimate authority for such an organization must be derived from Congress, it is assumed that in reaching its decision Congress would desire the opinions of experienced military and naval men. Generally speaking, military men of all armies who have had the widest experience in the study of problems of national defense and who during the World War were responsible for the successful conduct of large military operations, combining all means of combat, including aeronautics, are practically unanimous in the opinion that military aeronautics is in all respects a part of the Army, and that to transfer it to a department independent of the Army would seriously affect the efficiency of the Nation’s combined forces as a fighting machine. Opposed to these views will be found the opinions of a certain number of military aviators. These adverse opinions have been given the most careful consideration. They carry on their face, however, limitations of vision regarding the great problems of the combination of all arms to accomplish decisive results. As technical experts in technical matters their views should be decisive; but even in the broader problems of commercial aeronautics itself, it is to be observed that the aviator does not determine general policy – business managers, financiers, and executives who have studied the general powers and limitations of aircraft are the men who determine upon and carry but the broader questions of policy.
10. In further support of the fundamental considerations stated in paragraph 9, the following quotations are submitted:
Sir Douglas Haig, commander in chief of the British expeditionary forces, in his final report, when speaking of airplanes, tanks, and other mechanical devices, says:
“It should never be forgotten, however, that weapons of this character are incapable of effective independent action. They do not in themselves possess the power to obtain a decision, their real function being to assist the Infantry to get to grips with their opponents. To place in them a reliance out of proportion to their real utility; to imagine, for example, that tanks and airplanes can take the place of infantry and artillery, would be to do a disservice to those who have the future of these new weapons most at heart by robbing them of the power to use them in their best effect.”
Gen. Ludendorf [General der Infanterie Erich F. W. Ludendorff, Erster Generalquartiermeister (First Quartermaster General) 1916-1918] speaks as follows:
“In order to provide aircraft support for the infantry, special battle aeroplane flights were formed. As had hitherto been done by individual airmen, they dived down from great heights and flew along at a low level, attacking with machine guns and light bombs the infantry lines, the artillery, and, as the practice extended, the enemy’s reserves and transport columns, as well as columns of troops coming up from farther in rear.
“Airmen as line fighters: Originally intended to be an ‘ auxiliary arm to the Infantry, these battle flights were finally given important tactical tasks. Thus the air force gained a new field of activity of the greatest importance. The airmen, in the course of their duties, were not only reconaissance troops who had to fight; they were not only bomb carriers for destructive work far in the enemy’s rear, but they had, like infantry, artillery, and all other arms, to take part in the fighting on the ground.
“Like other combatant forces, they were a destructive arm in the great battle on land. This, indeed, became their main object, and the aerial combat was only a means of attaining it.”
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The board appointed by Gen Pershing consisting of seven experienced officers, of which Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman was president, reported on the tactical operations of air forces and the development of air forces as follows:
” (1). Development – Tactics – The Air Service developed along the following general lines: (a) Observation, contact and Artillery registration; (b) distant reconnaissance and bombing operations; (c) Aerial combat; (d) Combat against ground troops.
“(2) All four of these functions will continue in the future and increase in scope. However, the last is susceptible of greater development. The combat against ground troops did not become noticeable until 1918, and did not reach its maximum capabilities by the end of the war. This class of aerial work can be made more efficacious and decisive than the distant bombing operations and should receive the greatest attention.
“(3) In order to successfully combat this form of aerial attack, there appears to be no reason why an efficient and extensive counter-aerial service should not be developed. Hand-in-hand with the foregoing, there must be a security aerial service, i.e., a service for the protection of the ground troops from aerial attacks.
“(4) The intimate association between the ground troops and the aerial units assisting or operating with them demands that these two elements be an integral part of the same command – and as a consequence, the corps and divisions must have air units regularly assigned to them. These units must move with them, and be considered just as much a part of the corps and division as the infantry, artillery and other arms.
“(5) On the other hand, the Aerial forces required for distant and strategical reconnaissance and bombing operations need have little association with the ground troops. The system of concentrating in the army troops, all protection, reconnaissance and bombing units, has not met the battle field needs and will be obsolete in future development.
“(6) Our experience then can be summarized as follows
“The Air Service development, organization and utilization should be: (1) reconnaissance, contact, observation, and registration units to be integral elements of divisions and Army corps; (2) tactical combat and bombing units, and battle field security service units, to be integral parts of the Army corps and the Army; (3) strategical bombing, reconnaissance and combat units, to be elements of the Army troops.
“(7) In general, nothing so far brought out in the war shows that Aerial activities can be carried on, independently of ground troops, to such an extent as to materially affect the conduct of the war as a whole. It is possible, perhaps, that future wars may develop aerial forces of far greater extent than those provided in this war. It is safe to assume that air forces will not be developed for war purposes to such an extent as to largely supplant ground and water forces, until such a proportion of the people become air-faring people as now are known as sea-faring people. In other words, aerial activity must bear much the same relation to the commercial life of the nation as at present sea-faring activities bear to public trade and commerce.
“(8) There are two factors for the present which must be considered – First, the expensiveness of the material and the provisions for its special maintenance. If it becomes possible to use in a war only Aerial forces, the matter of expense is not a paramount question. But, if on the other hand it is necessary to maintain ground and water forces for the war, then the expense of aerial forces must be considered and the Aviation provided must bear its proper relation to the other forces.
“(9) Second, the question of superior command must be considered. If a war should take place where only aerial forces are used, question of authority between ground and air forces would not arise, because the superior command would rest in the proper air commander. When, however, ground forces are to be used, and as long as present conditions prevail, we believe ground forces will continue to be the major part of those provided, the authority must be vested in the commander of the ground forces, and aviation must continue to be one of the auxiliaries of the principal arm, the Infantry. For the present, all questions of air tactics, air strategy and employment of aviation must be governed by the well known and established principles of military art. Superior officers must be so thoroughly well grounded in the fundamentals of war that this important auxiliary will be always used in pursuance of the paramount object.
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Capt. H. C. Mustin, United States Navy [CAPT Henry C. Mustin, CO Air Detachment, Pacific Fleet 1919-1921], in his report to the Secretary of the Navy [Joseph Daniels (D-NC) 1913-1921], based on his observations as a member of the American Aviation Mission, states:
“In both France and Italy it is believed that the scope of an air ministry should not include control of military and naval aviation personnel and operations. Also, it Is believed that the Army and Navy should conduct independent training of their aviation personnel except in that time of tuition that is common to all classes of aviation; furthermore, they believe that each service should carry on the experimental aviation work that is of a nature exclusively military or naval, for that kind of work always requires the cooperation or assistance of other branches of the service It is developed for.”
Capt. Mustin also states that the British Navy holds similar views.
A recent cable from the military attaché of the United States in London [LTC Oscar N. Solbert] reports that the offices of the Royal Air Force believe in a separate air service, but that “Both the army and the navy are thoroughly opposed to plans for an independent air service, claiming that economy and efficiency in the field are only possible when air forces are under the control, respectively, of the army and the navy. In the opinion of our attaché, their motive is less selfish than that of the Royal Air Force. All are agreed that production and experiment should be under one head.”
As shown in Appendix A, in both France and Italy, Army and Navy opinions are opposed to separating the air force from the Army and Navy.
11. Military air force not controlled by the Army and Navy: As an argument for a separate department of aeronautics, it is frequently stated that, during the recent war, the British found it necessary to reorganize their air service and to place the British Army and Navy air forces under an air ministry. Parts of this combined force were assigned to work with the Army and Navy, while a third part constituted an independent air force controlled by the air ministry in London. It is a matter of common report that this British policy was adopted for political rather than military reasons. The British air ministry was not established until 1918. The excellent record made by the British air service during the war was not the result of the establishment of this air ministry. Those give some credit to the air ministry for regulating production and distribution of available aircraft material. Other than this, the air ministry, as such, accomplished little of value. The important accomplishments under its direction were direct results of previous experience in the war, and were nothing more than the completion of work begun before the creation of the air ministry.
It would be a serious mistake to blindly follow any system that was adopted by a European nation under circumstances such as led to the adoption of the air ministry in Great Britain.
As a concrete instance of the dangers of following European methods and policies without giving them careful study may be cited the fact that after Gen. Pershing had studied the operations of the European allied armies who were at grips with the enemy in stabilized warfare, he was from the beginning convinced that the correct training of our Army was to prepare that Army for offensive operations in open warfare or warfare of movement. Under this doctrine the American Army was trained. Gen. Pershing constantly emphasized its importance. In his final instructions as he was forming his first American Army he instructed his subordinate commanders under date of July 11, 1918, that:
“1. The ultimate purpose of the American Army is the decisive defeat of the enemy, and not the mere passive result of the pure defensive. To realize this ultimate purpose, it is essential that every officer and soldier of these forces be imbued with the offensive spirit.”
The system of training which Gen. Pershing adopted proved in the end to be correct and was directly at variance with the doctrine under which the allied armies had been training. Indeed, some of our own officers had come to the belief that training for trench warfare or warfare of position was the correct method of training and in a pamphlet issued by our War Department in 1917 for the training of Infantry we find in the first paragraph that “Training for trench warfare is of paramount importance.” Upon the recommendation of Gen. Pershing, this was promptly revoked and we went to our traditional training for the offensive. After the great German offensive of March 21, and for which the German armies had been specifically trained, the allied commanders realized that they had been training under a wrong doctrine and
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were obliged during the war to change their system of training and adopt the American method.
Any independent air force not completely controlled by the commander in chief in charge of operations and acting without instructions from him violates the well-known fundamental principle so forcefully exemplified during the world war that “unity of command is essential to the success of military operations.” Any air force, whether we call it independent or not, if controlled by the commander in chief, will invariably be assigned such missions as will help in the accomplishment of the great objective for which the entire force is striving. The same air force, if not operating under the direct orders of the commander in chief, will occasionally accomplish useful missions in assisting the general objective, but under such circumstances any assistance given to the general plan will be incidental. As a matter of fact in the last analysis it was found that the so-called Independent Air Force of Great Britain really was no longer independent. The chief of that force was placed under the orders of the commander in chief of the allied armies. It was realized that acting independently he could accomplish practically nothing for the success of the campaign.
12. The activities of the military and naval services come together at the coast line only, and, in the case of aeronautics, overlap to a certain limited extent. Due partly to the press of war conditions, there has been a lack of complete coordination of these activities, resulting in some duplication of material and corresponding waste, inevitable in any war. This condition is being rapidly corrected. It is frequently stated that a Department of Aeronautics would obviate all such difficulties and is, in fact, necessary in order to effect the proper coordination of military and naval aeronautical activities. Such a suggestion for overcoming this particular difficulty takes no account of the fact that, in place of the coordination of only two services which have but the limited sphere of common activity (the coast line), the establishment of an Aeronautical Department controlling during war a military air force, independent of the Army and Navy, would require the coordination of three services instead of two, with spheres of common activity extending over the entire field of operations. Furthermore, the independent air force would tend to absorb an undue proportion of the maximum amount of aircraft that could be produced, to the detriment of effective action by the Army and Navy. These difficulties and tendencies together with the duplication of staff departments and supply services, complicating the system of supply, communications, and bases, would seriously handicap the offensive power of the military operations.
13. Under paragraph 7 was considered a suitable agency for the administration of funds under the assumption that the Government would obligate itself to large annual appropriations over a period of years for commercial aeronautics. The question will now be further discussed under the contingency that the Government will not adopt that as its policy. Should the Government adopt a policy whereby appropriations for aeronautics are not so large and whereby those appropriations which are made are to be devoted mainly to the improvement of the public service departments, such as the Post Office Department or the military and naval services, the requisite agencies for the expenditure of the appropriations are already in existence, in so far as it is a question of determining what is to be purchased. There still remains the question of so distributing the purchases as to protect and stimulate the manufacturing resources of the Nation. Competition between the purchasing departments would be directly detrimental to the interests of the Government, while entire lack of coordination would tend to disorganize the industry. This is a matter which can not be satisfactorily adjusted by a joint board on which only the departments interested are represented. In addition to their interests there is the public interest, which is concerned with the development of the producing industry. If this public interest is to be adequately conserved, a centralized agency having full power or control is essential. The situation does not seem to warrant the establishment of a separate department. A suitable organization for this purpose would be an aeronautical commission created by the President under specific provision of law – the head of this commission to be a civilian with the title of director of aeronautics, who should report the action of the commission direct to the President. On the commission should be one member from each Government department directly interested in aeronautics; also one civilian member representing, in general, the producing industries.
This commission should have authority to employ aeronautical engineers and experts of all classes, as well as the necessary administrative personnel to enable it to perform its functions, among which should be the following:
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(1) Control of all national and international questions pertaining to civil aeronautics.
(2) (a) Prepare and submit estimates for appropriations necessary in the performance of its functions.
(b) Consolidate and transmit estimates submitted by all Government departments for aircraft and aircraft material.
(3) Control the procurement of all aircraft and aircraft material bought by the Government.
(4) Conduct all Government development work pertaining to aeronautics except such as pertains solely to the military and naval branches.
(5) Prepare to meet in case of war the demands of the military and naval services for increased production.
(6) The commission will not control the operation of aircraft in use by any Government department.
14. Congressional organizations for supervision of appropriations: One of the arguments in favor of the creation of an executive department of aeronautics is that such action would facilitate the creation of a single congressional committee to handle aircraft legislation and appropriations. At the present time these matters are in the hands of three or more committees, and it is difficult to secure adequate supervision of their action, but such supervision by a central committee of Congress will naturally result as to all major items If the recommendations of this board become effective.
15. Organization of military air force: There is no doubt that one of the sources, perhaps the most active source, of agitation for a separate department of aeronautics is the Air Service of the Army. It seems desirable that the reasons for this be stated fully and frankly. The important reasons appear to be:
(a) A belief that it is desirable and essential to create a force for fighting purposes independent of either the Army or Navy.
(b) A belief that no future exists for the personnel of the Air Service so long as it remains a part of the Army.
(c) A belief that a military air force suitable to our position in the world will not be developed under the Army, but that aeronautics will continue to be regarded as an auxiliary to other branches.
There are various other viewpoints of less importance and for which less justification appears.
It does not seem necessary to enumerate or discuss the minor questions involved but the three viewpoints above enumerated deserve careful study. We have already set forth the consensus of opinion among all military and naval men, with the exception of some military aviators, regarding (a) a military air force independent of either the Army or Navy. With respect to the other two questions they pertain exclusively to our own service rather than to the broader aspects of aeronautics. In so far as they are based upon the recommendations of the War Department as to the future organization of the Air Service in the proposed reorganization of the Army, it must be admitted that they are not altogether groundless. This board is convinced that permanency of commission in the Air Service, should be the same in all grades where it is practicable as is the case in other combat branches of the Army. Compared to other activities the period of a man’s life during which he may be expected to accomplish first-class results as an aviator is short. This is an admitted fact which must be faced and which can not fail to have an important bearing upon the question of an organization of an air force. Only a careful study, in which the best talent of the Air Service is utilized, can determine the maximum number of grades in which commissions should be permanent. It is not believed that the instructions to the present board require such a study, but it is thought proper that the necessity therefor should be suggested.
As to the adequate development of the Air Service, it is thought that the pessimism now existing would in large measure disappear if provision were made for permanency in commission in that service, a suitable organization provided, and provision made for details from the Air Service the same as from the other branches of the Army, and especially details to the General Staff and to the service schools.
16. Conclusions:
(1) Peace-time air fleets at all adequate in size for war needs can not be maintained by any nation. The great air fleets necessary for war must be produced after war begins.
(2) To provide facilities for aircraft production at the beginning of war, commercial aeronautics must be developed.
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(3) Under present conditions. the only effective stimulant to the development of commercial aeronautics is Government assistance in large annual appropriations guaranteed for a period of a considerable number of years. If this policy be adopted by the Government, these appropriations, in order to accomplish the result desired, must be continued until commercial aeronautics can stand by itself as a dividend-paying business.
(4) The Government itself should not undertake the production of aircraft in Government factories unless trade combinations in the production of military aircraft should eventually be formed against it.
(5) Federal agencies should be provided for the adequate control of various national and international matters connected with aeronautics.
(6) A single Government agency should be responsible for the procurement of all aircraft used in the Government service.
(7) A single Government agency should have charge of all development work, in so far as same is common to all branches – military, naval, and commercial. This agency should be provided with the means to carry on experimentation and research.
(8) The military and naval air forces should remain in integral parts of the Army and Navy and be completely under their respective controls both in peace and in war, no matter what may be the decision as to the establishment of a separate aeronautical department or agency.
(9) There should not be created any military air force independent of Army or Navy control.
17. Recommendations: As a result of its deliberations and conclusions, the board submits the following recommendations:
(a) That the Army and Navy retain as integral and essential elements of their organizations and operating respectively under their complete control all military and naval air forces that may be provided by Congress.
(b) That further study be given the question of the details of organization of the air force for the Army, bearing in mind the fact that a military air force is an essential combatant branch of the service and should, in so far as may be practicable, be placed on an equal footing with the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery; and that in seeking the proper solution to this problem the personnel of the existing air service should be given full opportunity for an expression of their views and an adequate voice in the final determination.
(c) That Congress be requested to decide whether it desires:
(1) To make large annual appropriations guaranteed over a period of say not less than 10 years for the stimulation of commercial aeronautics.
(2) To make appropriations which are to be devoted mainly to the improvement of the public-service departments, such as the Post Office Department or military and naval services.
(d) If the policy indicated under (c)-(1) be adopted, a commission should be provided with personnel, powers, and duties as outlined in paragraph 13 of this report.
18. There being no further business before it, the board adjourned sine die at 11:25 p.m., on October 27, 1919.
Charles T. Menoher
Major General, United States Army, President of the Board
Frank W. Coe
Major General, United States Army
William J. Snow
Major General, United States Army, Recorder
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