MG William Lassiter.
The Lassiter Board’s final report (minus appendices) is taken from:
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives. Report of a Committee of Officers Appointed by the Secretary of War to Consider in All Details a Plan of War Organization for the Air Service. 69th Congress, 1st Session. Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs: 1150-1154.
These papers have been reproduced as originally written, with spelling corrections and editorial additions highlighted and bracketed in blue. If you find any errors in my transcription, please do not hesitate to contact me.
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE
Mach 17, 1923
Subject: Proposed war organization for the Air Service.
To: Maj. Gen. William Lassiter, General Staff.
1. The Secretary of War directs that a committee composed of the officers hereinafter named to be called into conference by the senior member thereof at such time or times as may be convenient for all members, for the purpose of considering in all details a plan of war organization for the Air Service as outlined by the Chief of Air Service [MG Mason M. Patrick] in Exhibit A, third [endorsement], dated February 7, 1923, on letter A. G. 319.12, 9-9-22, Misc. E, from The Adjutant General to the Chief of Air Service, dated December 18, 1922, and of making recommendations to the War Department in the premises.
DETAIL FOR THE COMMITTEE
Maj. Gen. William Lassiter, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Briant H. Wells, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, United States Army; Brig. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman, General Staff; Col. Irvin L. Hunt, Quartermaster Corps; Lieut. Col. John W. Gulick, General Staff; Lieut. Col. Frank P. Lahm, General Staff.
Maj. Herbert A. Dargue, Air Service, will act as recorder for the committee.
2. The Secretary further directs that the committee call the Chief of Air Service to give a full explanation of his plan, and call such other officers as are available and as may be necessary to supply data needed for a full consideration of the matter, and that the senior member of the committee notify The Adjutant General of the Army of the date of the conference in sufficient time to permit orders directing General Drum to be present.
BENJ. ALVORD,
Adjutant General.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C., March 22, 1923.
Pursuant to the foregoing instructions, the committee met at 10 a.m., and thereafter daily, except Sunday, until the completion of its duties.
I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED
To determine the proper strength and organization of the Air Service, both in material and personnel, to meet peace and war requirements, and the best means for the development of same.
II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM
1. The present peace and war organizations of the Air Service are based upon the recommendations contained in the “Report of the special committee appointed by the director, war plans division, to define the general plan of organization to be adopted for the Army of the United States, provided by the act of June 4, 1920.” This report was approved by the Chief of Staff August 31, 1920. At that time the authorized strength of the Regular Army was 18,000 officers and 280,000 enlisted men of which the Air Service allotment was 1,516 officers and 16,000 enlisted men (including 2,500 flying cadets). Since then the peace strength of the Regular Army has undergone several reductions. There are now authorized 12,000 officers and 125,000 enlisted men of which the Air Service allotment is 1,061 officers and 8,764 enlisted men (including 190 flying cadets). Of these only 880 officers and 8,399 enlisted men and 91 flying cadets are now available (February 28, 1923). In view of the limitations imposed by law on the strength of the Regular Army in time of peace and the small percentages of officers and enlisted men allotted to the Air Service, the peace organization of the Air Service now bears no relation to the war requirements and affords little or no foundation upon which war requirements in either personnel or materiel can be built.
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2. The fundamental principle underlying the organization recommended by the special committee in the above-mentioned report is stated as follows:
“All aviation in an army should be employed for participation in the battle, and all strategical bombardment and reconnaissance should be done by aviation in the general headquarters reserve.”
In accordance with this principle, organic observation aviation was provided each division, corps, and army, and a sufficient amount placed in the general headquarters reserve; attack aviation with the proper proportion of pursuit was assigned each army with one attack wing in the general headquarters reserve; and bombardment aviation with all airships was placed in the general headquarters reserve. Since the approval of the above-mentioned report, considerable experience has been gained by the operation of aircraft under the present organization, additional studies have been made and exercises carried out, great progress has attended the development of aircraft throughout the world, a better conception has been obtained of the methods which aircraft are likely to employ in the future — all these indicate the necessity for reconsideration of the whole subject of organization and the employment of aircraft.
3. The Chief of Air Service was, therefore, on December 18, 1922, directed to prepare a study on this subject and to submit recommendations regarding changes that might appear desirable in the organization of the Air Service, and particularly submit a plan for a war organization from which facts concerning an adequate peace establishment for the Air Service might be deduced. On February 7 1923, the Chief of Air Service submitted to the War Department such a plan, which is attached hereto and marked “Appendix I.”
4. An analysis of the war organization proposed by the Chief of Air Service (Appendix I) discloses the fact that while it contemplates the employment of all types of aircraft with the field armies it does not allow any types, except observation planes and balloons, as integral parts of the mixed combat organizations comprising the field armies. The plan assembles the greater part of the total aircraft in a pool in the general headquarters reserve with the idea that all types will be available for the execution of specific missions assigned by general headquarters, the accomplishment of which may have little or no connection with the operation of ground troops; also, the plan contemplates that there shall always be available from the pool all types of aircraft which, as the mission requires, may be detached for service with the ground troops. This conception of organization appears to be contrary to one of the principles set forth in the report of the special committee approved August 31, 1920, and quoted in paragraph 2 above.
5. The Chief of Air Service appeared before the committee and explained in detail his views regarding the present and prospective condition of the Air Service as to materiel, personnel and organization in peace and in war. The Chief of Air Service also furnished the committee with the following statements, hereto appended:
Appendix II. General statement.
Appendix III. A proposed peace organization for the Air Service.
Appendix IV. Graphic representation of state of aircraft Industry.
Appendix V. Aircraft procurement program.
Appendix VI. Program for increase of present peace strength Air Service by yearly increments.
6. Conditions are critical in the Air Service with respect to aircraft on hand, on order, and prospective purchase from funds now available or those that will be available in the fiscal year 1924. The aircraft now available or that will be available in the near future on the basis of the 1923 and 1924 appropriations are as follows:
The larger part of the aircraft now on hand is war produced and is deteriorating rapidly. Furthermore, 80 per cent of these airplanes are of an obsolescent training type or are unsuitable for combat use. It is essential that new aircraft be
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provided to replace that built during the World War, and that additional aircraft be purchased to make up the deficit that is increasing rapidly. Since it now requires about 18 months to secure delivery of aircraft after the contract has actually been executed, it is evident that no relief can be expected for the present situation before 1926. Appropriations now being made for the Air Service for the purchase of now aircraft are inadequate for the requirements of the existing reduced peace establishment of the Air Service or even for the necessary annual replacements therefor. The requirements of the existing reduced peace establishment, including the war reserve for overseas garrisons, are as follows:
A comparison with this table and the one immediately preceding in this paragraph clearly indicates that unless steps are taken to improve conditions in the Air Service it will in effect be practically demobilized at an early date.
7. The aircraft industry in the United States at present is entirely inadequate to meet peace and war requirements; it is rapidly diminishing and under present conditions will soon practically disappear. It depends for its existence almost wholly upon orders placed by governmental services. A reference to the graphic representation of the state of the aircraft industry in Appendix IV shows how far the industry falls short of being able to meet war requirements and that planes in sufficient quantities would not be produced under present conditions until nearly two years after the war had begun. The development of commercial aviation will stimulate the aircraft industry, but orders from the military services must be depended upon, at least for the immediate future, if this industry is to be kept alive. Should a national emergency confront this country within the next few years the Air Service would not be able to play its part in meeting it.
8. The committee discussed at great length the future development of the Air Service, an aircraft-production program, a program for meeting mobilization requirements, and the tactical organization of the air force and Air Service both for peace and for war.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE
1. The committee finds our Air Service to be in a very unfortunate and critical situation. Since the World War aviation has come to play an increasingly important part in military operations, but measures have not been taken in our country to keep step with this evolution. Due to the reduction of the Army the personnel of the air force has been diminished; moreover, aircraft have not been manufactured to replace the types produced during the World War. For lack of business our aircraft industry is languishing and may disappear. It requires time to begin production of airplanes and it takes time to train personnel. We can not improvise an Air Service and yet it is indispensable to be strong in the air at the very outset of a war. Therefore, it is the opinion of the committee that our peace-time Air Service have a strength and an organization permitting rapid expansion to meet the first requirements of a war and then be capable of steady expansion to meet the ultimate requirements of the war. It is impossible under present conditions to pass at once from our present peace status to the peace status desired, and hence we should have a development program extending over a period of years, providing for yearly increments in both personnel and material, and adopted by Congress as a continuing project.
2. The minimum peace establishment in materiel and personnel to meet M day requirements of the War Department mobilization plan are as follows:
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The above will train sufficient flying personnel to maintain in the Organized Reserve, National Guard, and the Regular Army the airplane flying personnel for three field armies, the airship pilots for only two field armies, and the balloon observers for only one field army. The zone of the interior can produce additional trained personnel after M day as needed. The equipment listed includes the reserve necessary to bring the peace establishment to war strength. The greatest possible number of reserve officers on active duty should be used as part of the 4,000 officers required for the peace establishment. Detailed statement of the minimum peace establishment, together with chart of its organization, is shown in Appendix VII herewith.
3. The peace establishment indicated in the preceding paragraph can be expanded to meet probable war requirements as set forth in War Department mobilization plans. These are as follows:
Detailed statement of the probable war requirements together with chart of their organization, is shown in Appendix VIII herewith.
4. The most practicable way in which the peace requirements in material can be met is to adopt a continuing production program extending through a period of approximately 10 years, with adequate annual appropriations and authorizations to make the program effective. Such a program is shown in detail in Appendix V. It is estimated that the annual appropriations required to make this program effective, exclusive of pay, upkeep, and housing of personnel, will be approximately $25,000,000, of which approximately $10,000,000 would be for operating expenses and $15,000,000 for purchase of new aircraft, the first amount increasing and the second decreasing as the program develops — the total remaining at about the sum stated.
5. A continuing personnel program extending through a period of approximately 10 years should parallel the production program. Such a program is shown in detail in Appendix VI.
The personnel required for the peace establishment in excess of that now allotted to the Air Service should be in addition to the present authorized strength of the Regular Army. It is impracticable to secure from the present authorized strength the personnel needed for this expansion of the Air Service without taking the additional strength from one or more of the other combatant arms, which are already unduly reduced, and therefore the committee is of the opinion that Congress should be asked to provide additional personnel for this requisite expansion of the Air Service.
6. The tactical organization of the peace and war establishments, indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, should be based on the following principles:
(a) Observation Air Service should be an integral part of divisions, corps, and armies, with a reserve under general headquarters.
(b) An air force of attack and pursuit aviation should be an integral part of each field army, with a reserve under general headquarters.
(c) An air force of bombardment and pursuit aviation and airships should be directly under general headquarters for assignment to special and strategical missions, the accomplishment of which may be either in connection with the operation of ground troops or entirely independent of them. This force should be organized into large units, insuring great mobility and independence of action.
The tactical organization of the peace and war establishments, in accordance with the principles above enunciated, should be indicated in Appendices VII and VIII, respectively.
7. In order to avoid duplication, and to insure the most economical development of adequate production facilities to meet war-time requirements, a well-balanced joint Army and Navy program, extending through a period of years, covering the requirements of both the Army and the Navy, should be formulated. With this object in view, the Secretary of the Navy should be invited to prepare a program to meet the requirements of the Navy. The Navy program, together
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with the Army program herein recommended, should be referred to the joint Army and Navy Board for consideration and for the formulation of a joint Army and Navy program.
8. The joint Army and Navy program, formulated as indicated in the preceding paragraph, should be submitted to Congress at its next session, accompanied by a special message from the President, setting forth its importance and embodying a recommendation that it be adopted.
NOTE. – Slight errors in figures in original report are corrected herein; see appendices for details.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
That the policies and programs outlined in Section III immediately preceding be approved and made effective.
V. CONCURRENCES
The Chief of Air Service.
William Lassiter
Major General, General Staff
Briant H. Wells
Brigadier General, General Staff
Hugh A. Drum
Brigadier General, United States Army
Stuart Heintzelman
Brigadier General, United States Army
Irvin L. Hunt
Colonel, Quartermaster Corps
John W. Gulick
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff
Frank P. Lahm
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff
Herbert A. Dargue
Major, Air Service, Recorder
APPENDICES
I. Letter of December 18, 1922 with [endorsements] and statements of the approved war organization of the Air Service and that proposed by the Chief of Air Service.
II. General statement of the Chief of Air Service.
III. Statement of peace organization proposed by the Chief of Air Service.
IV. Graphic organization of state of aircraft industry.
V. Army procurement program.
VI. Program for increase of present peace Air Service by yearly increments.
VII. Statement of minimum peace requirements and chart of peace organization of the Air Service proposed by the committee.
VIII. Statement of probable war requirements and chart of war organization of the Air Service proposed by the committee.
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