Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell (D-OH)
The Crowell Mission’s final report, along with CAPT Henry C. Mustin and Secretary of War Newton Baker’s written dissents, are taken from:
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives. Report of American Aviation Mission. 66th Congress, 1st Session, War Expenditures Vol. 3. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 (Aviation) of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department: 3041-3056.
These papers have been reproduced as originally written, with spelling corrections and editorial additions highlighted and bracketed in blue. If you find any errors in my transcription, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Report of American Aviation Mission
Benedict Crowell (D-OH), Assistant Secretary of War
LTC James A. Blair, Jr., USA
Samuel S. Bradley, GM Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association
Howard E. Coffin, Council of National Defense
COL Halsey H. Dunwoody, USA
George H. Houston, Pres. Wright-Martin Aircraft
Clement M. Keys, VP Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor
CAPT Henry C. Mustin, USN
Report submitted on 19 July 1919.
To THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
SIR: In accordance with your instructions, the American Aviation Mission visited France, Italy, and England. It was able to confer with various ministers of these Governments, ranking Army and Navy commanders, and the foremost aircraft manufacturers.
A thorough study and investigation was made by your mission of all forms of organization, production, and development. As a result of these studies your mission desires to emphasize the universal opinion of its members that immediate action is necessary to safeguard the air interests of the United States, to preserve for the Government some benefit of the great aviation expenditures made during the period of the war, and to prevent a vitally necessary industry from entirely disappearing. Ninety per cent of the industry created during the war has been liquidated. Unless some definite policy is adopted by the Government, it is inevitable that the remaining 10 per cent will also disappear.
In placing this matter before you the subject falls into three important heads:
(1) General organization.
(2) Development, commercial.
(3) Development. technical.
I. GENERAL ORGANIZATION.
The findings of the American Aviation Mission and its recommendations are submitted after a careful review of the situation in the allied countries mentioned, but always keeping in mind the situation in the United States. Under the above subheads the results of these investigations are presented to you, which, in the opinion of the mission, demand the most earnest and immediate consideration along the broadest lines, with a view to establishing some fixed policy which will save the aircraft situation in the United States and give the United States an equal place with the great powers of Europe in this great new commercial development.
The American Aviation Mission therefore recommends the concentration of the air activities of the United States, military, naval, and civilian, within the direction of a single Government agency created for the purpose, coequal in importance with the Departments of War, Navy, and of Commerce, to be called in this report, for the purposes of identification, the National Air Service.
In making the above recommendations, the following views and data of the mission are presented:
Visits were made by the mission to England, France, Italy, and conferences have been held with those largely responsible for the successful prosecution of the war and especially with those men most experienced in the aerial development within those countries. Among others, interviews have been had with:
France: Maréchal Foch, commandant en chef des armées AIliées [Généralissime Ferdinand J. M. Foch, AT, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies]; André Tardieu, ministre des affaires Franco-Américaines [Andre P. G. A. Tardieu (AD), Department of Franco-American War Cooperation]; Géneral M. Duval, chef de service de l’aeronautique [Général de Brigade Maurice Duval, AT, Chief of Military Aeronautics]; Jacques Dumesnil, deputé, formerlysous-secrétaire de l’aeronautique [Jacques-Louis Dumesnil (Rad.), Under-Secretary of Aeronautics]; M. Loucheur, président de conseil de guerre, now minister of reconstruction [Louis Loucheur (AD), Minister of War Manufacturing and Industrial Reconstruction]; Daniel Vincent, deputé, formerly sous-secrétaire de l’aviation [C. A. Daniel-Vincent (Rad.), Under-Secretary of Aeronautics]; Gaston Minier, deputé, chef du comité aeronautique au senat [Gaston Menier (Rad.), Chief of Senate Committee on Aeronautics]; and Major d’Aiguillon of the commission interministerielle de l’avlation civile [Commission of Inter-Ministerial Civil Aviation].
England : Hon. Winston Churchill, M. P., secretary of state for war and secretary of state for air; Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander in chief of the British Army; Admiral Sir David Beatty, R. N., admiral of the fleet; Maj. Gen. Right Hon. J. E. B. Seely, under secretary of state for air [Maj. Gen. Jack E. B. Seely, BA]; Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, chief of air staff, royal air force; Maj. Gen. E. L. Ellington, director general, supply and research royal air force [Maj. Gen. Edward L. Ellington, RAF]; Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick H. Sykes, controller general civil aviation, royal air force; Sir W. A. Robinson, secretary, air ministry [Sir W. Arthur Robinson (LP)]; and Maj. Gen. Sir. W. S. Brancker, royal air force, now with the Aircraft Manufacturing Co. (Ltd.) [Maj. Gen. Sir. W. Sefton Brancker, RAF (Ret.), Airco].
Italy: G. Grassi [Signore Grassi], chief of the Italian aviation in Paris; Col. Guidoni, Italian foreign aeronautical mission [Colonnello Alessandro Guidoni, REI]; Admiral Orsini, chief of Italian naval aviation;
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Col. Crocco, chief of the technical bureau; and Signor Conti, secretary of state for aviation.
In all countries visited, and in the minds of all persons met in conference, appears an extraordinary similarity in condition and in conclusions drawn from the experiences of the five difficult years of mistake and achievement in the prosecution of the war. Perhaps no stronger or more simple presentation of the regard in which the future of aviation is held in allied countries can be given than by quotation from two letters of M. Clemenceau [Premier Ministre Français Georges B. Clemenceau (Rad.)], copies of which were obtained in France. The first is addressed to the President of the United States [Pres. T. Woodrow Wilson (D-NJ)], urging upon him the immediate consideration of matters aeronautical and in connection with the peace conference. The second is addressed to the President of the Republic of France [Président de la République Française, Raymond N. L. Poincaré (AD)], submitting the draft of a decree creating a separate department of aeronautics placed transitorily under the ministry of war – an intermediate step possible without legislation and looking to the early creation of an independent ministry of the air:
LETTER FROM M. CLEMENCEAU TO PRESIDENT WILSON.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY, 16, 1919.
Interallied aviation committee.
The President of the Council, and President of the Interallied Peace Conference.
MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your answer of February 7 to my letter of January 24. I [enclose] herewith copies of the letters which I have received from Lord Milner [the Rt. Hon. Lord Alfred Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies] and from Monsieur Orlando [Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri della Repubblica Italiana Vittorio E. Orlando (UL)], as well as my replies.
I am pleased to note that you agree in principle with my proposition to create an aviation committee for after the war. I take the liberty of insisting on the necessity of creating this committee without delay, in order to be able to utilize it as an advisory organ for the peace conference. Indeed, the clauses for aerial protection seem to have at least an importance equal to the clauses for military and naval protection; and it is of the greatest interest to have a study made by competent personalities of the measures to take against the eventual constitution of a German military fleet. I can not insist too strongly on the imperious necessity of this study, on account of the proximity of Germany to London, Brussels, Paris, and Rome.
Likewise I adhere entirely to the British proposition which seems to me practical and effective, and I request you likewise to give it attention. In case it seems acceptable to you, I wish you would let me know if you could delegate two representatives to the next meeting of the new interallied committee, which will take place on Thursday, March 6, at 10 o’clock, at the Directory of Aeronautics, 260 Boulevard St. Germain.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration, etc.
CLEMENCEAU
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.
PARIS, June 6, 1919.
Mr. PRESIDENT: Aircraft has developed considerably during the war. It should at this time adapt itself to a no less important part in peace time. But because of the many initiatives which cooperate in its new use and development, the efforts and means are dispersed in various ministerial departments.
The future aviation in France will only be assured by the coordination of all efforts and the unification of the general services. Also, it will give the advantage of better work from the personnel and credits which are actually effected to similar objects In different ministries.
With this object in view, and according to the propositions of an interministerial conference which I am able to assemble, I have the honor to submit for your signature the following decrees creating an organ of general coordination of aviation.
This should not be confused with any of the particular aviations of the various ministerial departments. At its origin it will be attached transitorily to the ministry of war.
I aim sir, yours, respectfully,
GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,
President of the Council, War Ministry.
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Even before the report of this mission can be given consideration, a step similar to that proposed by France will have been taken by Italy. Here, however, the department of aeronautics is being placed under the ministry of transportation – a makeshift arrangement frankly acknowledged transitory and immediately possible without the legislation needed to create the clearly foreseen ultimate – the Italian ministry of air.
England more than two years ago began the coordination of her aircraft activities – an effort which has resulted in placing her well in the lead in practically every phase of aerial development and which has resulted in bringing her months ago to the establishment of a ministry of air, coequal with her ministries of war and of the navy. That the present ministries, both for war and for air, are centered in the same individual has no significance other than that of momentary expediency. The whole trend of events touching the art of aeronautics in its broad relation to world progress, the experience in all allied countries (including the United States) during the five years past, the frankly discussed future plans under present consideration in foreign quarters and the views everywhere encountered by us, leave your mission impressed with these inescapable conclusions:
1. That Italy, France, and England realize fully the importance of aircraft in the military-naval and civil-commercial aspects and propose to encourage the general development of the art through governmental aid to commercial industry.
2. That Great Britain has come to consider the dominance of the air as at least of equal importance with that of the seas, and is frankly and avowedly planning a definite policy of aerial development to that end.
3. That any future war will inevitably open with great aerial activity far in advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can not but incline to that belligerent able to first achieve and later maintain its supremacy in the air.
4. That for economic reasons, no nation can hope in time of peace to maintain air forces adequate to its defensive need except through the creation of a great reserve in personnel, material, and producing industry through the encouragement of civil aeronautics. Commercial aviation and transportation development must be made to carry the financial load.
5. That no sudden creation of aerial equipment to meet a national emergency already at hand is possible. It has been proven within the experience of every nation engaged in the war that two years or more of high pressure effort have been needed to achieve the quantity production of aircraft, aircraft engines, and accessory equipment. The training of personnel, including engineering, production, inspection, maintenance, and operating forces – covering some 50 distinct trades and some 75 industries – has proved in itself a stupendous task when undertaken upon the basis of the war emergency alone.
6. That the rapid adaptation of aircraft to the commercial uses of peace is everywhere being studied and planned. Under the forced draft of war, this newest and fastest agency of transportation has been brought to a high state of development. It must now be redesigned to meet the progressive demands of a civilization at peace.
7. That because of its great speed and range of operation, oceans, States, and even countries are being passed over with a greater facility than are townships and counties traversed by the motor car. The need for international agreements governing the construction, operation, and safety of aerial apparatus of all kinds is immediately before us.
8. That for the first time in the world’s history the stage is set for a close international cooperation in the development of a great art at the very threshold of its era of commercial utility. Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan not only invite but urge the United States to share in this work.
9. That just as we now have national, international, and interstate regulations, laws, and agreements covering rail and steamship travel and the safety and navigation of the seas, so must we have similar regulations governing aircraft and the uses of aerial navigation throughout the world. The international committee sitting in Paris, under the peace conference, gives the first long step in this direction.
10. That the need in each country for a single authoritative point of contact for the conduct of all international aviation affairs – legal, operational, technical, and political – is imperative. Such agencies have already been set up in
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England, France, and Italy. The United States has under the terms of the international convention no option but to follow these leads.
11. That in England, France, and Italy sentiment is undoubtedly in favor of the centralization of aircraft development under one authoritative head. Difference of opinion has been encountered only in the matter of Army and Navy personnel and in the question of the independent fighting force.
England holds the initiative and is building her royal air force coequal with the army and navy. France and Italy follow England’s lead, but seem inclined to leave questions of operating personnel for the present to war and navy departments, and to debate the need of an independent fighting air service. In all cases forces operating in conjunction with military and naval units, function under the military or naval high commands.
12. That among the many considerations of early moment requiring governmental direction may be mentioned the following:
(a) Federal and international laws governing the use of air routes.
(b) Federal and international control of pilots’ licenses; examination and tests required.
(c) Federal inspection of all commercial aircraft for airworthiness, or suitability for service.
(d) Customs and other regulations for crossing State and National boundaries.
(e) International standards for methods of communication and signaling.
(f) International standards covering the marking or charting of air routes and of landing places for both day and night use.
(g) International specifications and rules governing the construction, equipment, and operation of standard airdromes, landing stations, signal towers, and other aids to aerial navigation.
(h) Port regulations and fees covering seaplanes.
(i) Federal taxation of aircraft and license for its use.
(j) Safety measures and devices; legislation forcing adoption.
(k) Fire-underwriter standards, regulations, and safeguards; insurance of machines, of material, and of persons in transit (property and life).
(l) The legal status of privately owned aircraft; the property rights of the air; liability for damage inflicted and incurred.
(m) International standards and specifications covering accepted practice in quality of materials, in factors of safety, and in methods of construction; an engineering literature of the new art must be created by international approval.
(n) Maps and navigation charts of the United States and its territories.
13. That we of [today] are conceivably no more qualified to judge as to the scale and development of the aircraft of 10 years hence than were we of even five years ago able to foretell the achievements of [today]. We must bear in mind always that for every one mind focused upon things aeronautical in this earlier period, some thousands of keen minds are now versed in the aircraft art. With proper governmental encouragement, rapid progress seems inevitable.
14. That the broadest consideration for the ultimate welfare of American aviation must be given in the constitution of any organization set up for the coordination and control of aeronautics within the United States. The prerogatives and ambitions of governmental departments, and of individuals must be assayed at true value.
15. That past experience and every economic consideration point to the vital need for the formulation by the United States of a definite, comprehensive, and continuing policy for the development of every phase of the aircraft art. Our Government is now faced with the task of nursing and actively encouraging a new transportation industry, whose healthy growth is vital to the future progress and defense of the Nation.
Because of the lack of a definite, intelligent, and sympathetic policy in our governmental aircraft organization since the armistice, our American aeronautical Industry, built up at such great expense of money and of effort, is rapidly disappearing. No sensible business man is justified in keeping money invested in the aircraft industry under the conditions which have maintained in the United States since November 11.
16. That the closest possible relations must continually exist between the aircraft agency of the Government and the production and commercial industry engaged in aircraft development.
17. That the industries involved in the production and commercial use of aircraft must be given recognition and representation in connection with all national and international activities bearing upon the direction and control of aeronautics.
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In the foregoing brief presentation of its conclusions, your mission has touched upon the aeronautical policies already in effect or under present discussion in England, France, and Italy. Great Britain’s plan of organization certainly warrants our most careful consideration. Its salient points are clearly set forth in the chart herewith attached. It is not argued that the British method is perfect, but it can be stated without fear of contradiction in any quarter that it stands [today] the most comprehensive governmental mechanism yet set up by any nation in the world for the encouragement, [up-building], direction, and control of its air resources. This organization has been born of five bitter years of trial, mistake, experience, and progress. It is the product of the best brains in the British Empire [focused] under the spur of national need and the demand of the British people. We in America may well study it carefully.
Your mission, in presenting its recommendations, desires to emphasize the view everywhere encountered that the future of aerial navigation and of aerial development generally is in only a limited sense a function of military and naval establishments. The air is a medium for commerce and communication and its direction to the peaceful uses of civilization must be unhampered by the necessarily restrictive views of these specialized departments.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
A. The concentration of the air activities of the United States, civilian, naval, and military, within the direction of a single governmental agency, created for the purpose coequal in importance and in representation with the Departments of the War, Navy, and of Commerce.
B. That the agency thus created be charged with full responsibility for placing and maintaining our country in the front rank among nations, in the development and utilization of aircraft for the national security, and in the advancement of the civil aerial transportation and communication arts.
C. That this governmental organization be formed in general as follows:
First. A civilian secretary for air.
Second. An assistant secretary, a civilian, responsible directly to the secretary for air for the management and operation of the department.
Third. Five or more divisional heads acting as chief of the [sub-departments] of (a) civil aeronautics, (b) military aeronautics, (c) naval aeronautics, (d) supply and research, (e) finance, etc.
Fourth. An air council, advisory in character, which shall be constituted by the secretary of air, including the assistant secretary of air, the chiefs of the several [sub-departments], and such other personnel as may be deemed advisable.
We desire especially to invite attention to the complexity and newness of the whole development of the aviation art, and to urge the broadest possible treatment of the subject during this formative period. We suggest that the lesser details of organization may well be left to the judgment and initiative of those called to assume the responsibility of directing this work. We desire also, in this connection, to call attention to the aircraft interests of the allied governments, and to emphasize the necessity for careful discrimination in the selection of men of industrial experience and broad vision.
D. The establishment of governmental institutions of education and training, including an air college, all open alike proper restriction to military, civilian, and naval personnel.
E. Such curricula and such arrangement of promotion in the national air service and such assignment and pay as to insure to the young man an attractive career whether he elect to remain permanently in the “national air service” or return to Army or Navy or to civil life .
F. The adoption of a system whereby Army, Navy, and civil personnel can be circulated in proper proportion through the national air service. This personnel would, unless permanently assigned to air work, be automatically returned to the military and naval sources or to civil life as an air service reserve after the educational and service periods in the national air service have expired.
It is felt that such a circulating system is vital to the coordination and ultimate efficiency of the three services and to the desired dissemination of a knowledge of and interest In the air among our people. The young officers of [today] will command the military and naval forces of [tomorrow], and will carry with them into the highest ranks an intimate knowledge of aircraft and of the strategy of its varied uses, in connection with operations on land or sea.
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The direction of civilian and commercial activities of all kinds will be made possible, and the closest contact and cooperation between the Government and the aeronautical industries assured.
All international relations touching aerial matters fall naturally within the jurisdiction of the secretary for air.
All responsibility for the supply of aircraft material and equipment of all kinds and for the training of personnel for all branches of the service is, in accordance with these recommendations of your mission, placed with the secretary for air. As some 27,000 items are involved in the equipment and maintenance of each air squadron on active duty, the need for a single responsible direction seems undebatable.
Upon the plan of organization here recommended, all squadrons and all equipment assigned by the National Air Service to meet the stated requirements of the Military and Naval Establishments pass automatically under Army and Navy command. Under National Air Service operational direction remain only those independent projects unrelated to the activities of the military and naval fighting fronts and such personnel and equipment as forms a surplus to the needs of the sea and land fighting arms.
The question of governmental organization for the development and utilization of our country’s air resources has been given consideration by your mission, seemingly from every angle. The recommendations made are general. No report could be made effective if burdened with the mass of details involved in the setting up of any governmental mechanism such as proposed.
There has been and will continue to be advanced many objections to the establishment of a department of the air. We believe none of them prove insurmountable. We believe the advantage gained to be such as to entirely overshadow any temporary difficulties.
Always in the past, in war by land or by sea and in the transportation activities of peace, we have thought in two dimensions only. We must now readjust our minds to think for all future time in three.
When this mission left the United States in May its members thought the Atlantic Ocean might be crossed before January 1, 1920. Within three months of our absence four successful crossings have been made and without the loss of a single life.
There must be no overoptimism. There are years of development and experimentation ahead. As in the case of all the other great agencies of civilization, the commercial and financially profitable use will come slowly. But here the immediate welfare and safety of our Nation is involved, and an intelligent and efficient direction of our aeronautical affairs will be demanded by the American people. American genius has given to the world the airplane, a new instrument of commerce and of war. But America has left its development to other nations, and, too late, realized the mistake of this neglect. She has paid the price. America now again has the opportunity, if not to lead, at least to take her place in the front rank and to gain to herself the full benefit which will surely accrue from an active and sincere cooperation in the engineering activities and in the scientific and commercial aircraft developments of those nations associated with us in the war.
But this will be impossible in the future as in the past if our aircraft activities remain dispersed among the several governmental departments and impossible of coordination for decisive action.
Upon the breadth of view and the vision of those in control of America’s policies depends our future as an air power.
II. COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT.
With reference to the commercial development of aviation your mission makes its recommendation based upon the following conclusions, which have been formed, first, through knowledge of conditions existing at present in America, and, second, the knowledge gained by its investigations abroad.
The investigations in England included visits to a number of factories, [aerodromes], and other points of particular interest, and interviews with the following gentlemen:
England: Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, K. C. B., D. S. C., chief of staff, air ministry; Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick H. Sykes, K. C. B., C. M. G., controller general, civil aviation; Maj. Gen. E. L. Ellington, C. B., C. M. G., C. B. E., director general supply and research; Gen. Huggins [Brig. Alfred Huggins, Deputy Controller General of Equipment]; Douglas Vickers, Vickers Co. (Ltd.) ; Capt. P. D. Ackland, Vickers Co. (Ltd.) [Capt. Peter D. Ackland, RAF]; Sir Percy Gerouard [Sir E. Percy C. Girouard], Arm-
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-strong, Whitworth & Co.; Sir Samuel Waring [Sir Samuel J. Waring, Bt.], of Waring & Gillow, who is also interested in five other aeronautical companies in England; Holt Thomas, Aircraft Manufacturing Co. [G. Holt Thomas, Airco]; Gen. Sir W. S. Brancker, K. C. B., D. F. C., Aircraft Manufacturing Co.; White Smith, British & Colonial Airplane Co. [Henry White-Smith, Bristol Aircraft]; J. A. Taylor, Cosmos Engineering Co.; Fadden [A. H. Roy Fedden], Cosmos Engineering Co.; Handley Page, [F. Handley Page] Handley Page Co. (Ltd.); Graham White, Graham White Co. [Claude Grahame-White, Grahame-White Aviation]; C. V. Allen, secretary of the Society of British Aircraft Constructions [Charles V. Allen, Society of British Aircraft Constructors]; and Leslie P. Langton, Black & Manson Insurance Underwriters, who have specialized in aircraft insurance.
Members of the mission also visited the airship factory of Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., located at Selby, and the dirigible airdrome of the British Navy located at Pulham, where they examined the R-33, which is a replica of the R-34, and several smaller airships.
The mission’s investigation in France included visits to a number of French factories and flying fields and interviews with the following gentlemen:
France: Gen. M. Duval, directeur du service aeronautique; Senateur Gaston Minier, chef du comité aeronautique au senat; Pierre Etienne Flandin, deputé, formerly chef de l’organe interallié de l’aeronautique [Pierre-Étienne Flandin (AD), Chief of the Inter-Allied Aviation Committee]; Commandant d’Aiguillon, of the commission interministrielle de l’aviation civile; Commandant de St. Quentin, chef du service de fabrication de l’aviation [Chief of the Aviation Manufacturing Service]; Louis Breguet, of the Breguet Co. and Compagnie des Messageries Aeriennes [Louis C. Breguet, Société des Ateliers d’Aviation Louis Breguet (the Louis Bregeut Society of Aviation Workshops) and the Compagnie des Messageries Aériennes (the Air Mail Company)]; Bleriot, of the Bleriot Co. [Louis C. J. Blériot, Société pour l’Aviation et ses Dérivés (Society for Aircraft and its Derivatives or SPAD)]; Maurice Leblanc, Bleriot Spad Co.; Kaherer, Société Astru [Société Astra des Constructions Aéronautiques (Astra Society of Aeronautical Construction)]; Bazaine, Société Nieuport [Léon Bazaine, Société Anonyme des Établissements Nieuport (Nieuport Establishment, Ltd.)]; Maurice Farman, of the M. & H. Farman Co. [Maurice A. Farman, Avions Farman (Farman Aviation Works)]; Granet, secrétaire du chambre syndicale de l’industrie aeronautique [André Granet, Secretary, Aerospace Industry Trade Union Association]; Esnault-Pelleterie, président du chambre syndicale de l’industrie aeronautique [Robert A. C. Esnault-Pelterie, President, Aerospace Industry Trade Union Association]; Lieut Rene Fonck, premier French ace [Capitaine René P. Fonck, formerly of Escadrille (Squadron) 103]; Maurice de St. Blanchard, secretary of the Aero Club de France; and Comte de Libersee, former pilot and at present much interested in the development of civil aeronautics in France.
Among the factories visited were: Morane-Saulnier, Breguet, Bleriot, Farman, Hispano-Suiza, and Renault, all of which are engaged in the manufacture of airplanes and motors.
The investigation in Italy included interviews by representatives of the mission with the following gentlemen:
Italy: G. Grassi, deputy, ex-chief of the Italian aeronautical mission in France; Col. Guidoni, Italian foreign aeronautical mission; Admiral Orsini, commander of Italian aviation; Capt. Bursaglia, chief of staff to the minister of marine; Peroni, director of the Ansaldo Co.; Casatti of the Caproni Co.; and Buzio, of the Macchi Co.
Representatives of the mission also visited the following factories in Italy, all of which are engaged in the manufacture of airplanes, balloons, and motors: Pomilio Co., Ansaldo Co., at Torino; Caproni Co., at Milan; Isotta:; Franchini, which was shut down due to a strike.
1. One of the most important problems to be considered in the rehabilitation of the world’s commerce, following the close of the war, is the development of aerial transportation for commercial purposes. Its one invaluable service, and that in which it surpasses all other means of transportation, is speed, that time-saving element which the world has always striven for and for which America, with its great distances, has such serious need. Reliability, safety, economy, and those other qualities of transportation service which are of value will steadily improve as the use of aircraft increases and experience accumulates.
2. It is as impossible to forecast the future of this new medium of transportation as it would have been to describe the speed, comfort, and safety of the modern steamship at the time the first steamship crossed the Atlantic [SS Savannah, 22 May – 20 June 1819 (29 days, 11 hrs)]. It is safe to say, however, that in time it will become one of the great transportation mediums of the world and will continue to offer the fastest and most direct means of transportation for persons, mail, and light freight known to civilization. Its development is limited only by the perfection of the mechanical devices used, with which we are constantly becoming more familiar, and by the extent of our knowledge of the atmosphere, which is becoming more thoroughly understood each year.
3. It is equally difficult to determine the speed with which this development will take place. In fact, this will be determined largely by the opportunities afforded to employ the brains of the engineer and the scientist on the problems involved, which in turn will be controlled by the financial resources available for such work. It is thought by some well-informed authorities that the next 5 or 10 years will see this new Industry through its initial stages and estab-
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-lished on a self-supporting basis, providing it is encouraged at this time. Adequate support can not be expected from private enterprise alone, and if no outside aid is given, 10 years will probably see this industry in America still struggling for a foothold and far behind its European competitors, who will receive substantial aid of many kinds.
4. History has shown repeatedly that no nation can afford to neglect the highest possible development of its transportation mediums regardless of the opportunities existing for immediate profit to the private enterprise concerned. This is particularly true of aerial transportation, which is not local in its nature, but which is essentially of a national and international character, due to the great distances covered and to the speed with which it links together far-distant points. This principle has been so clearly understood that an international agreement has been established between the Allies and their associates by which international flight of aircraft has been provided for in a far-sighted manner, thus making immediately possible the flight of private craft from one country to another on a basis as clearly defined by law as that governing the movement of steamships, except, of course, that the practice of ages of ship travel is missing in the case of aircraft.
5. The development of aviation is progressing so rapidly at this time that it is difficult even for those in close touch with it to keep up with its progress. During the past two months the Atlantic has been crossed four times by aircraft: First, by a seaplane of the American Navy [31 May 1919, LCDR Albert C. Read and crew aboard the Curtiss-built NC-4]; second, by an airplane of Great Britain [15 June 1919, Capt John W. Alcock and Lt Arthur W. Brown piloting a modified Vickers Vimy bomber]; and finally by an airship of Great Britain which has twice demonstrated its ability to fly between England and America [6 July 1919 and 10 July 1919, Maj George H. Scott commanding the hydrogen-based Beardmore R-34]. All of this has been accomplished without the loss of a single life. Airships are now building in England which will be able to carry from 5 to 10 tons of mail, in addition to the necessary fuel and crew, and cross the Atlantic from London to New York in one-half the time made by the fastest steamships. Who can say such transportation facilities will not greatly serve civilization and be of immeasurable value to our own country If properly developed and used?
6. Already lines of aerial transportation are being used in England and France in a small way for commercial purposes, but the distances in these countries are so short that relatively little advantage can be gained, so such ventures will develop slowly. A daily service from London to Paris has been in operation for some time, and promises to be quite serviceable as soon as it can be relieved of its war time military supervision. Other lines now in operation are from Paris to Lille and Brussels and from Paris to various points in Alsace-Lorraine and German occupied territory. Among other plans, English private interests are projecting airplane lines from Cairo to the Cape and Cairo to Bombay, and French interests are planning to run a line to Algeria and Morocco. These lines will carry mail, passengers, and express, and it is expected that they will materially shorten the time between European centers and their far-distant terminals. The United States Post Office Department has carried mail by airplane from New York to Washington for over a year with a record of nearly 100 per cent delivery at each end every day. It is now inaugurating a line from New York to Chicago which will shorten the mail time between these two points to about one-half. It is also projecting a two-day service from New York to San Francisco. England is already desirous of organizing with the United States a trans-Atlantic airship line for mail service which would give a five-day mail service from London to San Francisco. Such a service Is entirely possible at this time, and its inauguration depends only upon adequate encouragement and financial support.
7. The risks involved in these ventures, due to unknown conditions of the atmosphere, imperfections of equipment, etc., are still so great as to make them impracticable from the point of view of private enterprise, undertaken for a profit. If left entirely to such private enterprise, aerial transportation will develop slowly and with many losses and backward steps, as did the steamship, the railroad, and the automobile, each of which, however, has ultimately become a vital factor in our civilization.
8. One of the striking features of our investigation in Europe was the unanimous belief that the use of aircraft in warfare and for national defense would continue to increase and that in the next war, whenever it might come, aircraft would be a far more vital factor even than it has been in this war. One of the greatest military authorities in Europe stated that in his opinion the first battle of the next great war would be in the air, and would very nearly decide which side would win, in that the side winning in the air would
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immediately have access to all of its enemy’s sources of supply and production, and would quickly cripple them by air raids upon an enormous scale. The opinion was everywhere expressed that the development of aircraft for purposes of national defense must continue and that sufficient flying and production facilities and personnel must be maintained at all times to insure an adequate supply in case of need. Due to the complicated and delicate nature of such equipment, to its rapid depreciation in use, and to its constant obsolescence, the expense involved in such a program would be very great, in fact, almost prohibitive in peace times.
9. The existence of an aerial transportation industry with a great commercial air fleet and of a strong production industry would greatly decrease the need for strictly military equipment and resources in that practically all of the aircraft and landing-field facilities and personnel, and the manufacturing and maintenance facilities and personnel employed by such commercial activities, would be available as a reserve in time of war. It is evident, therefore, that the most economical way to develop a strong air service for national defense is to encourage by every means possible the use of aircraft for commercial purposes, and thereby build up a commercial fleet at relatively small expense to the Government, which would effectively supplement its strictly military equipment in time of need. America’s experience during the war has proven conclusively that aircraft faculties and personnel, and particularly production facilities and technical personnel, can not be obtained upon short notice, but only by long and continued experience and at great expense.
10. America’s production industry reached large proportions during the war, but since the signing of the armistice it has shrunken to a very small volume. Unless immediate attention is given to its conservation, it will practically disappear, and a considerable portion of the great sums expended in its development will have been spent fruitlessly. This industry does not require a large volume of business to keep it alive and healthy, but it does require a steady and dependable demand, otherwise private capital and enterprise will not long remain interested.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
Upon the basis of these conclusions, we offer the following plan for stimulating the development of commercial aviation as an aid to national defense and as a response to the demand that is already developing for improved commercial transportation through the use of aircraft.
(a) The Civil Aviation Division of the National Air Service should establish, with the advice of the Army and Navy, and the Division of Military and Naval aeronautics, a series of flying routes throughout the United States and its possessions and to contiguous foreign countries, which will be of military and commercial value. It should also prepare and publish maps and descriptions of each of these routes, suitable for the use of fliers.
(b) There should be provided at national expense certain flying fields in strategic locations, and suitable for military purposes, and encouragement should be given to the various States and municipalities to provide flying fields upon all flying routes, at points found desirable, thus eliminating the necessity for private ownership of flying fields except for strictly private use. Hangars should be provided at each flying field by the governmental authority owning the field (that is, Federal, State, or municipal), or where such fields are used constantly by private interests, they should be permitted to provide their own hangars immediately adjacent to and opening upon such flying fields.
The operation and use of such flying fields should be controlled by Federal law, so as to obtain uniformity throughout the Nation and conformity with international regulations.
(c) All flying routes and flying fields should be equipped at national expense with signalling and communication systems, including wireless telegraphy, wireless telephony, and searchlights, to thoroughly safeguard and guide aircraft in flight. The Government’s attitude in this matter should be the same as that maintained toward shipping in its lighthouse and coast-patrol service. The operation of signalling and communication equipment should be controlled by Federal law for the reasons indicated under item (b).
(d) A meteorological service should be developed to provide fliers and other aviation interests with accurate weather reports and other atmospheric data necessary to govern their activities intelligently. The value of this service to
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commercial aviation can not be overestimated as it will go far toward establishing reliability and safety of service, just as weather reports are of immeasurable value to ocean and lake transportation.
(e) Training facilities should be provided at various localities throughout the country, either at Government expense, or by private enterprise under Government regulation, with guaranties from the Government of a sufficient number of students to cover expenses. Such guaranties could be given by the Government without undue expense if it used such school for the preliminary training of its military personnel. Such a plan would encourage private enterprise to provide facilities for the training of the personnel needed for commercial requirements, which personnel in turn should become a permanent reserve for military requirements in time of need. There should be established at least one school for the teaching of aerodynamics and other branches of the science of aeronautics as recommended under the heading “Organization.” Encouragement should be offered to universities throughout the country to establish departments of aeronautical science.
(f) The Government should encourage the development of new design and aeronautical technique for commercial purposes along the lines recommended under the heading “Technical development”
(g) The department of aeronautics should maintain the closest possible relations with all civilized nations in determining and applying the rules and regulations which will govern the international use of aircraft, and there should be developed as rapidly as is consistent with proper consideration, a body of Federal law governing the use and airworthiness of aircraft for commercial purposes, which will safeguard life and property, and promote the commercial usage of aerial transportation. In order that commercial aviation may be helped and not hindered by such legal restrictions, it is of vital importance that aerial transportation be recognized at once as an element of interstate commerce and be made subject to one body of Federal law applying uniformly throughout all of the United States. It will thereby avoid the complications of individual State control which have proven to be such a handicap to railroad and automobile operation.
(h) Insurance of aircraft and its personnel against all kinds of hazards and risks involved should be encouraged in every way. The cost of such Insurance should be kept as low as is consistent with the risks involved.
(i) Encouragement should be given to the organization of private enterprises for carrying on aerial transportation. This encouragement might well be in the form of payment for the carrying of mail and expressage, and of guaranties as to the volume of such business. Compensation might be paid to such enterprises for keeping their facilities available for use in time of war. Guaranties of this kind coupled with opportunity to insure against loss by accident should make privately operated transportation lines a commercial possibility, but if it is found that private enterprise does not respond to such encouragement, then the Government should undertake certain transportation ventures on its own account and should continue to operate such lines until they are proven commercially successful. Ultimately they should be sold to private enterprises on such terms as would permit of successful operation, as it is not believed that commercial aviation will ever be successfully developed entirely under Government control.
(j) The remaining aircraft-production industry should be conserved and kept in a healthy condition by a well-defined and continuing program of production for military purposes, over a period of years. This policy should be continued until the commercial demand is adequate to support an industry of sufficient proportions to form an effective nucleus upon which can be built a war-time production in case of need.
III. TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT.
With reference to technical development, your mission in submitting its recommendations bases the following conclusions on a knowledge of conditions existing in the United States and upon extensive investigations conducted abroad:
(1) (a) The mission visited plants making or experimenting in materials as follows:
France: Breguet, Farman, S. P. A. D., Bleriot, Hispano-Suliza, Moran-Saulnier, Renault, and Nieuport.
Italy: Ansaldo, Maachi, Caproni, Pomilio. Isotta (plant closed by strike), and F. I. A. T.
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England : Handley-Page, B. A. T., Rolls-Royce, Phoenix Dynamo, Bristol, Vickers […], Cosmos, Sopwith, Grahame-White, A. B. C., and Armstrong-Whitworth.
(b) The mission has visited laboratory and experimental shops as follows: Institute Sperimentale Aeronautico [Aeronautical Experimental Institute], Rome; Eiffel Laboratoires, Paris; R. A. Factory, Farnsborough, England; Isle of Grain, Naval Experimental Station, England; Pulham Dirigible Station, England; Aeroplane Station, Contocelli, Italy, and Dirigible Station, Craspiano, Italy.
(c) The mission has interviewed the following governmental officials and industrial officers upon the subject of the proper organization, scope, and equipment of the technical division:
England: Gen. E. L. Ellington, head of department of design, London, Royal Air Force; Sir Percy Herouard, managing director, Armstrong-Whitworth Co., 8 George Street, Westminster, London; Gen. Groves [Brig Percy R. C. Groves], Royal Air Force representative with British peace commission, Paris; Gen. Brooke-Popham, director of research, London [Brig. H. Robert M. Brooke-Popham, RAF]; Holt Thomas, London; Douglass Vickers, Vickers (Ltd.), London; Grahame-White, Grahame-White Aircraft Co., London; and Sir Samuel Waring, London.
France: Maj. d’Aiguillon, Interministerielle de l’Aviation Civile, Paris; Louis Breguet, manufacturer, Breguet et Cie, Cie des Messageries Aeriennes, Paris; Cacquot [Albert I. Caquot], former chief technical section, department military aeronautics, Paris; Col. Dorand [Colonel J. Émile Dorand, AM], department military aeronautics, Paris; Gen. Duval, director military aeronautics, Paris; Jacques Louis Dumesnil, deputy, former undersecretary French aeronautics; Capt. de l’Estrade, technical service, French military aeronautics; Pierre Etienne Flandin, deputy, former chief interallied organization of French aeronautics, Paris; Messaguer [Louis Massuger], head of Hispano-Suiza Co., Paris; Maurice de Saint Blanchard, secretary Aero Club de France, and Daniel Vincent, deputy director, former undersecretary of aviation, Paris.
Italy: Commander Caldara, head of aviation, technical section, Rome; Casati, designer, Caproni Co., Milan; Lieut. Col. Ferduzio, designer of S. V. A. Rome Aeronautics, Rome;Col. Crocco, director of Institute Sperimentale [G. Arturo Crocco, Istituto Centrale Aeronautico (Central Aeronautics Institute)]; Col. Guidoni, Italian aeronautical mission; and Admiral Orsini, minister of Italian aviation, Rome.
2. The form of technical organization and control recommended by your mission differs materially from the controlling organizations in Italy, France, or England. Inasmuch as, for some time at least, military, naval, and departmental flying seems likely to lead in the development of the art, your mission desires to lay emphasis upon the necessity of having these departments strongly represented in the operations of the technical division so that they shall be materially helped and not hindered in their research, experiment, and development. To the same end, we are of the opinion that lighter-than-air, which in England at the present time is independent, can be best served by making it a strong subdivision of the technical division. In both England and France, due to the closeness of the war, the technical division is at present dominated by military personnel, but the opinion is unanimous that, as time goes on, civil personnel will supersede military in this division. Gen. Ellington, England, expressed this opinion flatly and Gen. Brooke-Popham, director of research, England, holds the same belief. In the Royal Aircraft Factory, at Farnsborough, civilian requirements are already overtaking military and naval. It has therefore been deemed wise to take the ultimate step at the outset in America, and a civilian head, of the type now earnestly sought in France and England, is recommended for America.
3. In equipment and personnel, England and France and Italy are maintaining their war strength in the technical division. At Farnsborough we found a complete experimental plant, employing about 3,000 men and women, and carrying on actively nearly every line of research, experiment, and development in motors, planes, and accessories. More than a score of planes, rigged with apparatus for aerodynamic experiment, were in the hangars and in the field. Physical and chemical laboratories seemed busy and fully manned. Estimating the lighter than air and the naval experimental and research personnel, it seems possible that the plant and the personnel engaged in the division in England is nearly, if not quite, equal to the entire trade in America at this present time. Obviously, this branch of aeronautics lies at the very foundation of the future, both military and civil, and to fail to bring it up the standard of the world can not help but mean dependence and mediocrity, or worse, in aeronautics in America.
4. The inclusion of such topics as armament (ordnance), wireless (signal corps), instruments (admiralty), photography (signal corps), design and bombs
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(ordnance), etc. has been found necessary in all countries. In reality the design and supply of such appurtenances is left to the departments or bureaus specializing in them, but research and experiment and development in methods of installation and use is essentially a function of the Air Service technical division, and must be carried on by this division, both in the laboratory, on the factory floor, and especially in the air, in the tank, and on the field.
5. In all the European countries we visited, we found that access to and use of the Government-owned facilities for development is established. The basis of such use varies and can be adapted to the circumstances. In all countries, however, the principle is the same, namely, that private interests must obtain access to Government facilities through the officers of the division so that new inventions, etc., shall pass the scrutiny and criticism of the division bends before going into actual experimentation. In England an attempt has been made to furnish facilities at cost, but to save overhead a schedule of flat prices is being worked out.
6. In England and France, the question whether or not to design complete motors and machines no longer exists. France was forced to design airplanes in 1916, due to the failure of her private firms to meet the crisis created by the Fokker [the “Fokker Scourge” – a period between 1 August 1915 and 25 March 1916 when the Fokker Eindecker dominated the Western Front]; but the immediate result appears to have been a quick return to the safer measures for encouraging the private designers to design and build, under the direction and assistance of the State. In England, the complete design of airplanes ceased with the SE-5:: and both Government officials and industrial officers offered ample testimony that the making of complete designs was a mistake and would not be repeated, due to its effect upon the private design departments. Without exception the manufacturers appear to take the view that it would be idle to compete by private efforts. If one division of the Government was designing and another division buying, as the Government would inevitably favor its own designers, even though not quite so good. The result of such a policy, therefore, would be to limit the number of sources from which useful designs can be obtained, and also to lower the standard of personnel in the design departments of private firms.
7. I n 1918, Sir Arthur Duckham, then director of aircraft supply for England, said:
“As we all know, changes in design, unless they are actually for new types, may be absolutely against production: most of our delays in production in this country and in the countries other than ours, have been due to the effort to obtain too great perfection at too early a time.”
Having this in mind, and having in mind also the disastrous effects upon production of similar causes in the United States, your mission asked explicit questions concerning the plan used by the technical division in England to minimize the result of such changes. The method is outlined as follows:
“All changes made necessary by the fact that a machine or motor is dangerous to the flyer or to the public are classed as No. 1. These are imperative, and are ordered by the director of design, without delay. No machine is allowed to be accepted or flown without such changes having been made.
“Important changes involving improvement in performance, etc., are classed as No. 2. Such changes are made by order of the modification board described below, and became effective only at such time as not to interfere unduly with production.
“Improvements and additions, not vital but often valuable, are classed as No. 3. They are made when convenient, both to Government and to contractor, and are not allowed to interfere with production or greatly increase price.”
A modification board shall pass on changes and classify them. This board consists of five members, one from the technical division, one from production, one from operations, one from finance and one from supply. In the case of No. 1 changes, the director merely reports that such and such changes have been ordered. All other changes are ordered by the modification board at regular meetings.
Your mission is of the opinion that the establishment of some such uniform practice, covering not only such changes but also the method of paying for them, is essential to production; and should be a responsibility of the technical division.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) That all technical functions of the Government in respect to aeronautics be centralized in a single technical division which shall perform the work for the Army, Navy, and civil aviation; and which shall be headed by prefer-
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-ably a civilian of wide executive experience. Such a division should include as assistants to the director, experienced representatives of Army, Navy, and other Government departments interested in aviation, who shall be nominated by the departments and shall act as [advisers] upon the special needs of the service they represent.
(b) That steps be taken forthwith to secure for the Units States, the most advanced equipment for research, experimental, and development work and for the testing of motors, planes, balloons, etc., for the testing of materials; for the examination and testing of aeronautical appliances, including armament and instruments; and that such an organization shall be established as shall assure at all times that the research, experimental, and development activities of the Government shall be second to none.
(c) That the research, experimental, and development facilities and equipment now used in aviation by the Army, Navy, and other Government departments be inventoried immediately and put, as far as practicable, under the control of the technical division, retaining such of same as may seem suitable and bringing them under a central control to make a complete and efficient equipment, and discarding such of them as unnecessarily duplicate others or are out of date. In making this change. great care should he exercised to guard against measures which might tend to interfere with suggestions for improvements and advances in aviation, material and methods, coming from the operating aviation branches of the Army, Navy, and Postal Departments. Experience has proved that the initiative In the advance of motors, planes, and accessories often comes from practical experience in the flying field, rather than from the scientific department of aeronautics. The technical division will, in cooperation with the operating forces, study, work out, and apply all such suggestions. Care should be taken also to avoid duplicating facilities already in existence, such as water tanks, armament testing grounds and many other items operated by existing departments. Arrangements should be made whereby the existing plants of this sort can be used, on a proper payment basis, by the technical division.
(d) That extreme care be taken in such a process of adjustment to provide ample means whereby the special technical needs of the (a) Army, (b) Navy, and (c) civilian flying shall receive attention. Means should also be provided whereby military and naval experiments of a secret nature can be carried forward.
(e) That the organization of the technical division cover by means of adequate personnel and equipment all branches of aeronautical research, experiment, and development, including the application and aerial use of instruments, armaments, and munitions, wireless telephone and telegraph, bombs and fittings, sights, fire-fighting apparatus, parachutes, air bags, and other safety devices, motor appliances fur air service, propellers, and photography.
(f) That all the technical facilities of the technical division for aviation, whether now existent or to be created, shall be available to private inventors and designers upon proper and reasonable terms.
(g) That in view of the experience of England and France, it is dangerous to allow the technical division to operate under normal or war conditions a department of complete design in heavier-than-air machines or in motors, as such competition results immediately in stopping private departments of design. The technical division, therefore, should be a critic of, and supplementary to, private design, rather than aim at design on its own account. The policy of the technical division should be to maintain and encourage a considerable number of well-manned and well-equipped private design plants and to cooperate with these plants in all undertakings that meet with the approval of the technical division, and to place orders with these plants, at fair prices, for design and for experimental construction of motors, planes, and appliances. Competition of the Government with the industry should be avoided; the only allowable exception being cases where, either on account of expense or for other cause, the technical division can not obtain needed material or design from existing sources.
(h) That careful thought shall be given to the establishment of competition in motor, plane, balloons, and accessory design, and encouragement be offered in every reasonable way to the promotion of competitive events and the establishment of standard records.
(i) That the technical division shall publish regularly and under competent management all the technical facts and data developed by the division that may
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be helpful to the Industry, reserving at the same time to itself the right to preserve secrecy in all matters that are deemed to be in the nature of naval or military secrets.
(j) That such a technical division shall maintain at all times as close touch as possible with the development abroad, and shall maintain representatives in Europe charged with the duty of liaison between the American and European technical organizations.
(k) That a definite method of payment for independent design, experimental production, changes in design, alterations, and adjustments be worked out by the Government as quickly as possible, to the end that the design and improvement of motors, planes, balloons, and appliances may be stimulated and not stilled.
(l) That the technical division shall include an inspection and testing department, which shall carry on all inspections and tests of experimental construction and revision, and which shall issue certificates of air worthiness for all machines for private and commercial use, and shall, from time to time, inspect all machines and appliances, including landing fields, signals, etc., used by public. In cooperation with the civilian division, this department shall have power to limit and control all types of air machines used in commerce, and to test such machines before they become production models. This department should have power to examine the inspection methods of all private concerns building aircraft, and to pass upon the quality of such methods from time to time.
(m) That close cooperation be maintained at all times with the purely technical aeronautical bodies and also with the industrial bodies engaged in aeronautics, so that standardization of materials and practices may be carried forward as rapidly as can be done without hindering the development of the art or entailing undue losses upon the trade.
Respectfully submitted.
Benedict Crowell
The Assistant Secretary of War
Howard E. Coffin
Member of Council of National Defense
Henry C. Mustin,
Captain, United States Navy
Halsey Dunwoody
Colonel, Air Service, United States Army
Assistant Chief, Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces
James A. Blair, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, United States Army
George H. Houston
President Wright-Martin Aeroplane Corporation
C. M. Keys
Vice President Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation
S. S. Bradley
General Manager Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association
MEMORANDUM NO. 1
Subject : Report of the organization committee American aviation mission.
1. I concur with the report of the organization committee of the American aviation mission to which I have affixed my signature, with the following reservations:
(a) Provided that the personnel employed in naval aviation operations shall be composed exclusively of of and enlisted men of the Navy, Marine Corps, Naval Aviation Reserve, and where required for shore establishments, of civilians under the employ of the Navy.
(b) Provided that all advanced training of naval aviation personnel excepting advanced aviation engineering courses, shall be under the direct control and supervision of the Navy.
(c) Provided that when officers and enlisted men of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Naval Aviation Reserve are detailed for duty with the proposed air department, they shall retain their naval or Marine Corps rank and ratings.
(d) Provided that administration and operation of all naval aviation forces shall be under the direct control of the Navy.
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(e) It Is recommended that the question of including in the proposed air department an offensive air force independent of the Army and Navy be left open, pending further investigation of this subject; and that the subject be investigated without delay by the mission in conference with Army and Navy representatives, who have made a special study of military and naval strategy.
Henry C. Mustin
Captain, United States Navy
MEMORANDUM NO. 2
Subject : Report of the development committee American aviation mission.
1. I concur with the report of the development committee to which I have affixed my signature, with the following reservation:
(f) Provided that nothing in the organisation of the proposed air department shall restrict the Navy in the following activities:
(a) Maintenance of an organization adequate for the preparation of general specifications, general plans and characteristics of the aviation mechanisms, accessories. and equipment required for naval purposes.
(b) Maintenance of an organization and facilities adequate for carrying on experimental aviation work of a class that is exclusively of a naval character, and that does not involve duplication of efforts and facilities in the proposed air department that are common to other aviation branches.
(c) Maintenance of an organization and facilities for conducting the acceptance and tactical tests of complete aviation mechanisms and accessories.
Henry C. Mustin
Captain, United States Navy
SECRETARY BAKER’S STATEMENT
In making public the report submitted to me by Mr. Crowell and his associates on the American aviation mission, I desire to emphasize the thoroughness and value of the studies made in England, France, and Italy with regard to the importance of aircraft and the essential dependence of the art for its development upon a sympathetic attitude in the Government. Those best informed throughout the world are in accord in believing that this new agency of transportation has possibilities upon which it is now quite impossible to set limits. They are further agreed that we face a period, more or less brief, in which the prospect of commercial return is not sufficiently sure to justify private enterprise in developing the airplane industry into a self-sustaining position.
The importance of aircraft as a military arm is obviously so great that we must leave nothing undone both to develop the art in its scientific and practical aspects and to provide facilities for rapid quantity production in the event of emergency.
From these considerations it is clear that the ingenuity and ability of American engineers and inventors must he coordinated and our national effort freed from wastefulness and duplication.
The mission has in my judgment gone too far in suggesting a single centralized air service. Army and Navy aviators are specialists in the art, both the airplanes and the pilots needed are of a different type from those needed in civil undertakings. The pilots particularly needed to be trained upon a different theory. Military pilots are trained to fight singly or in formation, and to operate in coordination with other branches of the military service, so that their training must be military. Their own efficiency and that of the other branches of the service depends upon the most intense and constant associated training, and a separation of the Air Service from the Army or the Navy would require coordination of their activities in time of war whereas effectiveness in military operation rests upon the concentration and singleness of authority, command, and purpose.
The point emphasized by the mission is the importance of maintaining adequate production facilities in this country. This, it is believed, can be brought about best by the establishment of a Government agency which will lay down the necessary rules, national and international, for aircraft operation, prevent discouraging lack of uniformity in State regulation, and generally stimulate private and public enterprises in perfecting and using commercially this mode of transportation, and by centralizing the placing of orders on Government account so as to have the incidental effect of making them contribute to the maintenance
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of aircraft production as an industry. it is not proposed, as I understand it, that great appropriations of public funds should be made for the establishment of uneconomic commercial air-service routes, but obviously an extension of our air-mail service could be made, and it could be further extended as the perfection of machines advances and their reliability of service is more and more established. Such encouragement as the Government may find it wise to give can be accomplished without sacrificing the science of military aeronautics. The joint board of the Army and Navy is already eliminating duplication and producing cooperation in developing the air service of those departments, and should Congress decide to extend its aid to the commercial development of aircraft, complete cooperation will be easy in all matters of invention, design, and production where the different aspects of the problem meet on a common ground.
Newton D. Baker
Secretary of War
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