BG. Billy L. Mitchell.
The full text of Mitchell’s report (which was actually a memo) was unavailable to me. However, large portions of his memo were published in the New York Times, and it was in this format that his dissent made the greatest impact.
“Mitchell Attacks Bomb Test Findings.” New York Times. 14 September 1921.
These papers have been reproduced as originally written, with spelling corrections and editorial additions highlighted and bracketed in blue. If you find any errors in my transcription, please do not hesitate to contact me.
MITCHELL ATTACKS BOMB TEST FINDINGS
General Reopens Controversy of Aircraft vs. Capital Ship With a Dissenting Report.
DEMANDS DEFENSE REVISION
Asserts Air Brigade Could Put the Atlantic Fleet Out of Action in One Attack.
Special to The New York Times.
CHICAGO, Sept. 13 – A sensational chapter has been added to the “aircraft versus capital ships” discussion that has caused so much comment in Washington this year.
This new development comes from a report made by Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, Assistant Chief of Air Service, on the bombing tests held two months ago off the Virginia Capes. The report was submitted to Major Gen. Charles T. Menoher, Chief of the Air Service, in the form of a memorandum.
The report has not been issued for publication by the Chief of Air Service. Its appearance is expected to cause a greater sensation than that which occurred in the Air Service administration last Spring when General Menoher warned General Mitchell to “speak softly.”
Statements made by General Mitchell in his report flatly contradict the reports submitted by the Congressional committee that witnessed the bombing tests. Those high in political circles believe that there may be a housecleaning in the Air Service when the story “gets around.”
Summary of Assertions
The outstanding statements in the Mitchell report are:
Aircraft can operate under conditions when seacraft is hopeless.
Aircraft can safely protect the entire coast.
Seacraft should cease operations when within 200 miles of the coast.
All naval activities should be confined to the high seas.
Had the army air service been permitted to attack as desired, the seacraft attacked would not have lasted ten minutes.
The first provisional air brigade could have put out of action the entire Atlantic fleet in one attack.
The problem of destruction of seacraft by airplane is finished. It has been solved.
The scheme of national defense should be revised at once on the following basis: A department of national defense, with sub-secretaries for army, navy and air service; a department of aeronautics co-equal with the Departments of War and Navy must be created at once.
The report stated that at present there is a complete lack of liaison or system about our national defense. It scored the present coast defense system, asserting that at least $1,870,000,000 had gone to create a coast defense that is little more than useless against hostile aircraft and hostile sea forces.
“Can Destroy Any Sea Craft”
General Mitchel’s report is as follows:
“Air forces with the types of aircraft now in existence or in development, acting from shore bases, can find and destroy all classes of seacraft under war conditions with a negligible loss to the aircraft. It is not necessary to destroy hostile seacraft at a distance greater than twenty-five miles off shore in order to protect the coast, as this distance exceeds the range of the most powerful guns at present installed. Aircraft, acting from suitable floating airdromes, can destroy any class of surface seacraft on the high seas.
“Conditions of weather affecting the air and sea conditions do not alter the statement made above, as aircraft can operate in operations in which seacraft cannot operate. There are no conditions in which seacraft can operate efficiently in which aircraft cannot operate efficiently.
“The weapons used in the recent exercises against the seacraft were bombs alone. Torpedoes, gas, gunfire, and mines were not employed. The army air service was not permitted to attack the targets as it would under actual conditions, and never was more than one-tenth of the brigade employed in a single attack.
“Had the army air service been permitted to attack as it desired, none of the seacraft attacked would have lasted ten minutes in a serviceable condition. The first provisional air brigade could have put out of action the entire Atlantic Fleet in a single attack. The value of the airplanes in the first brigade did not exceed the cost of a modern destroyer.”
General Mitchell then explains how battle ships under war conditions are much more vulnerable than the targets used in the bombing tests. A battleship with full steam and speeding ahead is a target much easier to hit and to put out of commission than the targets used, he asserts.
“The problem of destruction of seacraft by forces has bene solved and is finished” the report goes on. “ It is now necessary to provide an air organ –
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ization and a method of defending, not only our coast cities, but our interior cities against the attack of hostile air forces. Our recent manoeuvres show an enemy having gained control of the air – which gives him control of the sea – may land air forces from airplane carriers on any of the islands or keys along our coast, which cannot attack by troops or artillery, and from those points launch air attacks against our great centres of population, extending even to Chicago, St. Louis, and other Middle Western cities.”
The report then explains how Chicago, St. Paul, Omaha, Kansas City and other cities in the Central West would be laid open to airplane attacks and their cities bombed with high explosives and the citizens killed with gas and incendiary bombs.
Makes Four Recommendations
In conclusion, General Mitchell makes the following recommendations:
1. The establishment of an air force for frontier and coast defense.
2. The equipment of the navy for offensives on the high sea, and not for coast work.
3. Navy control should cease 200 miles from shore, protection of the land and the coast defense being left to the army and air service.
4. A more co-ordinate and working understanding between the different arms of the service. The present system, a heritage of our early wars, has clearly demonstrated that the present lack of co-operation is a “serious” fault.
“In this connection,” the report states, “an efficient solution of our defensive need will not exist until a department of national defense is organized with a staff common to all services. Subsecretaries for the Army, the Navy and for the Air Service must be created.”
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